Sequential Causal Normal Form Games: Theory, Computation, and Strategic Signaling

This paper extends Causal Normal Form Games to sequential settings by introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems, but its comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis reveals that, under standard rational assumptions, these causal frameworks offer no welfare advantage over classical Stackelberg equilibrium, thereby highlighting a fundamental incompatibility between rational choice and causal reasoning benefits in current game-theoretic models.

Dennis ThummThu, 12 Ma📊 stat

Variable selection in linear mixed model meta-regression with suspected interaction effects -- How can tree-based methods help?

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of tree-based methods, particularly stability-selected random effects trees, as robust complementary tools for detecting interaction effects in linear mixed model meta-regression, demonstrating their superiority over traditional linear methods when interactions are nonlinear and their growing competitiveness as the number of studies increases.

Jan-Bernd Igelmann, Paula Lorenz, Markus PaulyMon, 09 Ma📊 stat

A Hierarchical Bayesian Dynamic Game for Competitive Inventory and Pricing under Incomplete Information: Learning, Credible Risk, and Equilibrium

This paper proposes a hierarchical Bayesian dynamic game framework for competitive inventory and pricing under incomplete information, integrating Bayesian learning, strategic belief updating, and a credible-risk criterion to derive a conservative equilibrium that effectively balances profit maximization with uncertainty management.

Debashis ChatterjeeMon, 09 Ma🔢 math