42 papers
This paper demonstrates that to minimize justified envy in serial dictatorship mechanisms, agents should be ordered according to a Kemeny ranking of their priorities when preferences are identical and uniformly distributed, or a weighted Kemeny ranking when these assumptions are relaxed.
This paper employs a global game model to demonstrate how the interplay between public and private information, large sales, and collateral quality influences stablecoin depegging risks, revealing that greater private signal precision can paradoxically enhance stability in strong fundamental regimes and explaining the resilience of opaque stablecoins.
This paper establishes simple necessary and sufficient conditions for information cost functions to be monotone with respect to Blackwell and Lehmann informativeness orders, grounded in their garbling characterizations, and applies these criteria to evaluate several well-known cost functions from the literature.
This paper establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a stochastic mean-field game of optimal investment involving identical firms interacting through a time-dependent price, covering both finite and infinite time horizons as well as a deterministic counterpart.
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model demonstrating that the availability of "whataboutism" as a rhetorical deflection strategy exacerbates offensive speech and can lead to the complete breakdown of civility norms, particularly within polarized societies.
This paper analyzes quality-based screening in digital monopolies, demonstrating that costless replication leads to a dual inefficiency where the monopolist underinvests in the highest quality while distributing degraded versions, a dynamic where competition worsens underinvestment but improves distributional outcomes.
This paper demonstrates that in multidimensional sequential screening, a monopolist can frontload surplus extraction to transform the problem, and under specific conditions of common first-order stochastic dominance and invariant dependencies, the optimal mechanism simplifies to independently offering sequential screening for each good, thereby rationalizing membership-plus-separate-sales business models.
This paper introduces an algorithm capable of computing all evolutionarily stable strategies within nondegenerate normal-form games involving three or more players.
This paper proposes that absentmindedness, modeled as a form of bounded rationality where players cannot perfectly track game progression, serves as a novel source of bargaining power by enabling credible refusal of last-minute ultimatums, which forces preemptive concessions but ultimately leads to inefficient delays and rejected offers.
This paper demonstrates that while Bayesian learning from public information can simultaneously generate issue alignment and persistent polarization on individual dimensions, it cannot support stronger forms of polarization requiring divergence beyond marginal beliefs, with aggregate divergence ultimately depending on cross-issue separability.
This paper extends Kyle's (1985) seminal insider trading model to an infinite-dimensional, many-asset setting, deriving a parsimonious equilibrium with closed-form solutions for trading strategies, cross-market price impacts, and information efficiency.
This study develops a sequential team production model to demonstrate that optimal AI deployment involves stochastically replacing workers at the beginning and end of a workflow while preserving middle workers to maintain peer monitoring, a strategy that may intentionally underutilize AI capacity but ultimately increases average wages and reduces intra-team inequality.
This paper demonstrates that random utility rationality with aggregation is substantially weaker than standard aggregated random utility models (ARUM), identifying specific conditions for their equivalence and showing that violating these conditions leads to significant estimation bias.
This paper proposes that the negative skew and positive mean observed in stock returns stem from the broken symmetry of stochastic volatility between gains and losses, a phenomenon effectively modeled by a modified Jones-Faddy skew t-distribution that is validated using daily S&P 500 return data.
This paper introduces a notion of robustness for belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibria in incomplete information games and establishes that a generalized potential function provides a sufficient condition for such robustness, implying that in supermodular potential games, robust equilibria coincide with Bayes Nash equilibria.
This paper develops a theoretical framework demonstrating that optimal pricing for Large Language Models reduces to one-dimensional screening via committed-spend token budgets priced at marginal cost, a mechanism that aligns with observed industry practices and adapts to competitive dynamics between proprietary and open-source models.
This paper analyzes a public good game involving N citizens and a Governor who balances material gains from embezzlement against belief-dependent reputational concerns, fully characterizing the resulting equilibria to demonstrate how penalties, audits, and psychological incentives jointly determine the levels of citizen contribution and public good provision.
This paper demonstrates that macroeconomic fluctuations and tail risk arise from the interference of overlapping "productivity waves" propagating through a production network, where the dominant transient eigenvalue of the network's dynamics, rather than the static degree distribution, determines the magnitude of aggregate volatility and the significance of granular shocks.
This paper extends the theory of Monotone Comparative Statics to environments lacking a lattice structure by introducing the pseudo-lattice property, thereby enabling the analysis of mixed-strategy and trembling-hand perfect equilibria in multidimensional games.
This paper introduces an algebraic method, based on Eisenbud et al. (1977), for computing the index of completely mixed equilibria in finite games to demonstrate that any integer can be such an index, while showing that for monogenic equilibria the index is restricted to with non-zero values equivalent to payoff-robustness, and further extends these findings to extensive-form and boundary equilibria.