42 papers
This paper establishes general conditions for the existence of equilibrium in multi-principal mechanism design problems with strategic spillovers by introducing a novel approach that tracks both truthful outcome distributions and the sets of distributions achievable through unilateral deviations, thereby overcoming the discontinuities that previously prevented equilibrium existence.
This paper introduces the Sustainable Exploitation Equilibrium (SEE) as a refinement for dynamic games with irreversible failure, demonstrating that when survival-preserving actions exist, equilibria leading to collapse are sequentially irrational and the unique renegotiation-stable outcome maximizes the exploiter's value while ensuring the system's survival.
This paper characterizes margin-based voting rules by proving they are equivalent to rules satisfying the "Preferential Equality" axiom, which ensures that voters' identical pairwise preferences are treated with equal normative weight regardless of the voter's identity.
This paper proposes a robust identification approach to derive sharp bounds on the causal effects of school assignment despite strategic preference misreporting, demonstrating significant heterogeneity in graduation outcomes using data from Chile's university matching system.
This paper unifies the analysis of risk aversion in auctions by demonstrating that while greater risk aversion increases bidding in first-price auctions under specific payoff conditions, it decreases bidding in second-price auctions with a known outside option, with these bid-level effects translating directly into equilibrium comparative statics.
This paper introduces the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games where agents use finite samples of opponents' plays to inform logit-based decisions, demonstrating that large-sample behavior approximates a logit equilibrium in a virtual game with payoff distortions caused by sampling noise.
This paper reframes the reduction of complex labor and the transformation problem as defining a bounded feasible set of value distributions within a physical-production network, demonstrating that classical macro-aggregates can be simultaneously satisfied without violating physical reproduction constraints, a finding empirically validated using China's 2023 input-output data.
This paper proposes a framework for modeling how agents with uncertain causal beliefs update those beliefs based on feedback from their utility-driven choices, ultimately defining a steady state where the observed outcomes of optimal actions are consistent with the agent's current causal model.
This paper presents an analytically tractable model of heterogeneous workers and firms with one-to-many sorting to demonstrate how market efficiency shocks that favor productive firms drive business cycles and shape the cyclical dynamics of wage and productivity distributions.
This paper characterizes a family of geometric rules for intergenerational income transfers in an infinite stream by deriving them from axioms of consistency, continuity, independence, feasibility, and scale invariance.
This paper employs an equilibrium model to demonstrate that while news feed algorithms prioritizing viral stories can enhance information aggregation, they also risk creating self-perpetuating steady states where rational users collectively share and reinforce incorrect information, highlighting critical implications for platform design.
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework to analyze the incentives and efficiency losses in informal, privatized transit systems, demonstrating that targeted interventions like centralized routing and cross-subsidization can effectively mitigate performance gaps between decentralized profit-driven operations and optimal system outcomes.
This paper establishes the existence and structural properties of optimal consumption and saving policies under transition uncertainty with Bayesian learning, demonstrating how uncertainty about regime persistence shapes precautionary motives and long-run wealth accumulation through a newly identified dynamic mechanism.
This paper reformulates Constructal evolution as a nonsmooth dynamical system governed by Filippov differential inclusions, proving that irreversible transport constraints and resistance dissipation guarantee the existence, uniqueness, and global exponential stability of optimal flow architectures without relying on static optimization.
This paper employs an AI-guided evolutionary search framework to identify a new worst-case distribution that establishes a lower bound of 2.0749 for the approximation ratio of the Random-Offerer mechanism in bilateral trade, surpassing previous conjectures and known counterexamples.
This paper identifies and corrects a bug in the code used by Erdil & Ergin (2008) to compute stable improvement cycles, revealing that while their theoretical findings remain valid, the actual fraction of students benefiting from tie-breaking is slightly lower and their average rank improvement is slightly higher than originally reported.
This paper analyzes a multidimensional cheap talk game where a receiver can verify a single state dimension, identifying influential equilibria in which the sender reveals the highest state components and the receiver checks one of them, with the sender benefiting from communication only if such an equilibrium is preferred to the no-communication outcome.
This paper introduces the concept of weighted garbling to define a new information order on experiments, characterizing it through posterior belief supports and demonstrating its equivalence to dominance in static decision problems (via a fixed fraction of value) and specific stopping time problems.
This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing auction for an income-generating asset with costly post-allocation verification, demonstrating that the optimal mechanism combines upfront cash payments with linear royalty contracts that feature bidder-specific caps beyond which auditing ceases.
This paper models a designer's optimal strategy for restricting an experimenter's choice of information experiments to counteract persuasive incentives, demonstrating that when preferences are S-shaped, the best approach involves a "double censorship" mechanism that outperforms full delegation by balancing information provision with persuasion constraints.