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Beyond the Syntax: Do Security Experts Trust LLMs for NIDS Rule Engineering?

This paper investigates the trustworthiness of Large Language Models in Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) rule engineering through a study with domain experts, revealing that while large models generate syntactically correct rules, their semantic inaccuracies and hallucinations limit their deployment to a supportive drafting role rather than autonomous generation.

Original authors: Lorenzo di Filippo, Enkeleda Bardhi, Andrea Agiollo, Alessandro Palma, Silvia Bonomi, Fernando Kuipers

Published 2026-07-08
📖 5 min read🧠 Deep dive

Original authors: Lorenzo di Filippo, Enkeleda Bardhi, Andrea Agiollo, Alessandro Palma, Silvia Bonomi, Fernando Kuipers

Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer

Imagine you are the head of security for a massive, bustling city. Your job is to write "laws" (rules) that tell your security guards (the Network Intrusion Detection System, or NIDS) exactly what to look for. If a car drives the wrong way down a one-way street, the guard needs a specific law to stop it. If a thief tries to pick a lock, the guard needs a rule to sound the alarm.

For years, writing these laws has been a grueling, manual job. It requires deep knowledge of how the city works, how thieves operate, and the exact grammar of the law books. But as crime evolves faster than ever, human experts are getting tired, overwhelmed, and running out of time.

Enter Large Language Models (LLMs). Think of these as super-smart, AI-powered law clerks who have read every book in the library. The big question this paper asks is: "Can we trust these AI clerks to write the actual laws for our security guards, or will they just write nonsense that looks good on paper?"

The researchers didn't just ask the AI to write rules; they set up a rigorous test with 10 real-world security experts (the "judges") to see what happens. Here is what they found, explained simply:

1. The "Perfect Grammar, Wrong Meaning" Paradox

The AI clerks are amazing at grammar. When asked to write a security rule, the AI almost always gets the spelling, punctuation, and structure perfect. It's like a student who writes a sentence with perfect spelling and punctuation but says something that makes no sense in the real world.

  • The Finding: The AI can write rules that the computer accepts without errors (syntactically correct). However, when the human experts looked at them, they realized the rules were often too vague or logically flawed. About 12% of the time, the AI "hallucinated" (made things up), creating rules that sounded official but wouldn't actually catch a criminal.

2. The Size Matters (Big Brains vs. Small Brains)

The researchers tested AI models of different sizes.

  • The Small Models: Think of these as interns with very little training. They failed almost completely. They couldn't even write a rule that the computer would accept.
  • The Large Models: Think of these as senior professors. They were much better, getting the "grammar" right about 85–90% of the time.
  • The Catch: Even the "professors" needed a lot of help. They often got the first draft wrong and needed to be corrected multiple times before the rule was usable.

3. The "Too General" Problem

This was the biggest complaint from the human experts.

  • The Analogy: Imagine a security guard who stops every car because "some cars might be stolen." That's not helpful; it stops traffic and causes chaos.
  • The Reality: The AI tended to write rules that were too broad. Instead of saying, "Stop the red truck with license plate ABC-123," the AI would say, "Stop any vehicle." The experts said these rules would create too many false alarms (noise), making the real threats harder to find. The AI struggled to get the specific details right, like checking the exact type of traffic or the precise location of a clue.

4. The Human is Still the Boss

The researchers built a system where the AI acts as a helper, not a boss. They gave the experts a tool to chat with the AI, check its work, and fix mistakes.

  • The Result: The experts loved the tool for drafting and explaining things. They said it was easy to use and helped them understand complex rules faster.
  • The Trust Issue: However, no one trusted the AI to work alone. They viewed the AI as a "drafting assistant" or a "spell-checker," not a "rule writer." If the AI wrote a rule, the human had to rewrite it from scratch or fix it heavily before they would let it into the real system.
  • The Verdict: The experts said, "We will use this to speed up our work, but we will never let the AI make the final decision on its own."

5. The "Context" Clue

The AI did better when it was given more background information, like a "Proof of Concept" (a sample of how a hacker attacks). It's like giving the law clerk a photo of the criminal instead of just a description. However, the AI needed to be a "big brain" (a large model) to handle all that extra information without getting confused.

The Bottom Line

The paper concludes that while AI is a fantastic assistant for security experts—great for checking grammar, explaining complex ideas, and drafting rough ideas—it is not yet ready to be the architect of security rules.

The experts see a future where AI helps them work faster, but they insist on keeping the "human in the loop." They want to be the ones who double-check the work, because the cost of a mistake (letting a hacker in or stopping a legitimate user) is too high to trust a machine to do it alone.

In short: The AI is a brilliant scribe who writes perfect sentences, but it still needs a human editor to make sure the story actually makes sense.

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