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Two-Sided Prioritized Ranking: A Coherency-Preserving Design for Marketplace Experiments

This paper proposes Two-Sided Prioritized Ranking (TSPR), a novel experimental design that leverages position bias in ranked lists to estimate the total average treatment effect of price changes in online marketplaces while preserving platform coherency and mitigating interference bias.

Original authors: Mahyar Habibi, Zahra Khanalizadeh, Negar Ziaeian

Published 2026-03-17
📖 5 min read🧠 Deep dive

Original authors: Mahyar Habibi, Zahra Khanalizadeh, Negar Ziaeian

Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer

Imagine you are the manager of a massive, busy hotel booking website. You want to test a new idea: What happens if we lower the prices of 25% of our hotels?

In a perfect world, you could just show the cheap prices to half your visitors and normal prices to the other half, then compare the results. But in the real world of online marketplaces, this is a nightmare for two reasons:

  1. The "Fairness" Problem (Coherency): If you show a user a hotel for \100 and their friend sees the *same* hotel for \80, the first user will feel cheated. They might quit the site and never come back. You can't show different prices to different people for the same item.
  2. The "Crowded Room" Problem (Interference): Your search results are a list of 20 hotels. If you lower the price of Hotel A, people will click on it instead of Hotel B. Even if Hotel B's price didn't change, its sales will drop because it lost customers to Hotel A. This is called interference. If you try to measure the effect of the price drop on Hotel A, you accidentally mess up the data for Hotel B, too.

The Old Ways (And Why They Fail)

  • The "Split the Room" Method (User-Level A/B Test): You show the cheap prices to Group A and normal prices to Group B.
    • Why it fails: It violates the "Fairness" rule. Group A sees a \100 price tag; Group B sees \80. People get angry.
  • The "Random Shuffle" Method (Item-Level A/B Test): You keep the same list for everyone, but you randomly mark some hotels as "treated" (price drop) and others as "untreated."
    • Why it fails: It violates the "Crowded Room" rule. Because the treated hotels are cheaper, they steal all the attention from the untreated ones. Your data gets messy because the items are fighting each other.
  • The "Grouping" Method (Cluster Randomization): You group hotels by neighborhood (e.g., "Downtown" vs. "Beach") and give the whole Downtown group a price drop.
    • Why it fails: It's too slow and imprecise. You only have a few neighborhoods, so your data is "noisy." It's like trying to guess the weather by looking at only two clouds instead of the whole sky.

The New Solution: Two-Sided Prioritized Ranking (TSPR)

The authors of this paper propose a clever trick called TSPR. Instead of changing what people see (the prices), they change where things appear in the list.

Think of your search results like a concert lineup.

  • The Headliners (Top of the list): Everyone sees them. They get 90% of the attention.
  • The Opening Acts (Bottom of the list): Only the most dedicated fans see them. They get almost no attention.

How TSPR works:

  1. The Setup: You have a list of hotels. You secretly mark some as "Cheap" (Treated) and some as "Normal" (Untreated). You also add a few "Dummy" hotels (Placebo) to act as a buffer so the lists look balanced.
  2. The Split: You divide your visitors into two groups: Group A and Group B.
  3. The Magic Trick:
    • Group A sees a list where the Normal hotels are at the very top (Headliners), and the Cheap hotels are pushed to the bottom (Opening Acts).
    • Group B sees a list where the Cheap hotels are at the very top (Headliners), and the Normal hotels are pushed to the bottom.
  4. The Result:
    • Everyone sees the same prices. No one is cheated. Fairness is preserved!
    • The "Cheap" hotels get a massive boost in attention for Group B because they are at the top.
    • The "Cheap" hotels get almost no attention for Group A because they are hidden at the bottom.

Why This Solves the Problem

Because Group B sees the cheap hotels first, they buy them. Because Group A sees the normal hotels first, they buy those.

By comparing the total sales of Group B vs. Group A, you can mathematically figure out exactly how much the price drop helped, without the "Crowded Room" problem messing up your numbers. You aren't fighting the interference; you are using the interference (the fact that people only look at the top of the list) to your advantage.

The Analogy: The "Golden Ticket" Parade

Imagine a parade with 100 floats.

  • The Problem: You want to know if giving a float a "Golden Ticket" (a discount) makes it more popular. But if you give the ticket to a float in the middle, people ignore it because they are watching the float at the front.
  • The Old Way: You give tickets to random floats. The ones at the front get all the love, the ones at the back get none. You can't tell if the ticket worked or if it was just the position.
  • The TSPR Way:
    • Parade A: You put all the "Golden Ticket" floats at the very back. The crowd barely sees them.
    • Parade B: You put all the "Golden Ticket" floats at the very front. The crowd goes wild for them.
    • The Math: Since the only difference between the two parades is where the tickets are placed, the difference in crowd reaction tells you exactly how powerful the "Golden Ticket" is.

The Bottom Line

The paper proves that by simply reordering the list (putting treated items at the top for one group and the bottom for another), companies can run fair, accurate experiments without breaking trust with their users or getting confused by items competing with each other.

It's a "win-win":

  • Users see consistent, fair prices.
  • Companies get clear, accurate data on what works, even in a messy, competitive marketplace.

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