Analytical and Finite-Population Properties of Defector-Responsive Strategy Switching
This paper analyzes the analytical and finite-population dynamics of defector-responsive strategy switching in the Prisoner's Dilemma, deriving exact cost constraints for its viability and demonstrating that while constant switching rapidly establishes retaliation at the expense of unconditional cooperators, responsive switching offers a superior tradeoff by preserving cooperation after rescuing it from defectors.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of a preprint that has not been peer-reviewed. It is not medical advice. Do not make health decisions based on this content. Read full disclaimer
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