Risk reduction and resilience of interdependent energy and operational communication networks under hazardous impacts

Modern society relies on a hidden partnership between two massive systems: the grid that delivers electricity and the network that carries information. These are not separate worlds; they are deeply entangled. The power plants and substations need computers and communication lines to monitor their status, protect against faults, and send control signals. At the same time, the cell towers, data centers, and switching stations that keep our phones and internet running need a steady, reliable flow of electricity to operate. When these two systems are healthy, they support each other seamlessly. But when one is struck, the damage does not stop there. A failure in the power grid can knock out the communication network, and a hit to the communication network can blind the operators trying to fix the power grid. This creates a dangerous chain reaction where a single event can spiral into a widespread collapse.

This interdependence has become a critical concern as the world faces more frequent and severe threats, ranging from natural disasters to deliberate military attacks and sabotage. In recent years, the scale of these threats has grown dramatically. In Ukraine alone, hundreds of attacks have targeted energy facilities, while cyberattacks on the energy sector have surged globally. The challenge for engineers and security experts is not just to harden individual components, but to understand how a shock to one part of the system ripples through the other. If a missile destroys a power station, the resulting blackout might disable the very sensors needed to reroute power to other areas. If a cyberattack scrambles the data flowing to a control center, operators might lose the ability to isolate a damaged line, causing the failure to spread further.

Researchers Pavlo Anakhov and Viktoriia Zhebka have developed a new way to map these risks and design better defenses. Their work focuses on the specific chain of events that turns a single hazard into a cascading disaster. They break down the problem into a clear sequence: first, a threat occurs, such as an explosion or a cyber intrusion; second, this threat creates specific physical or digital damage factors, like a shockwave, a fire, or a corrupted data packet; third, these factors strike vulnerable elements, such as a transformer, a cable, or a server; and finally, the damage to these elements causes a functional disruption that can spread to the other network. By tracing this path, the researchers can see exactly where the system is most likely to break and how the failure might travel from the power grid to the communication network, or vice versa.

The study identifies seven main physical ways that explosions and attacks damage infrastructure. These include the blast wave that crushes buildings and equipment, the ground shaking that cracks underground cables, flying debris that pierces protective casings, intense heat that melts insulation, and electromagnetic pulses that fry sensitive electronics. They also account for less obvious effects, like sound waves that disrupt sensors and changes in the Earth's magnetic field that interfere with radio signals. Beyond the physical, the researchers also look at how information systems fail, considering the chances that data could be stolen, altered, or blocked. They treat these failures not as isolated incidents but as a connected web where a breach in one area can trigger a breach in another.

To manage these risks, the authors propose a structured system of protection measures that matches specific defenses to specific threats. Instead of guessing which measures might help, they create a correspondence matrix that links a particular damage factor, like a shockwave, to the most effective countermeasures, such as reinforced concrete or shock-absorbing mounts. This system includes a range of strategies, from short-term warnings and long-term risk assessments to the physical hardening of equipment and the creation of backup systems. Crucially, the approach emphasizes redundancy and reconfiguration. If a primary power line is destroyed, the system should be able to automatically switch to a backup line or reroute information flows through a different path. The goal is to intercept the damage, localize it so it does not spread, and replace or bypass the broken parts quickly.

The researchers also introduce a method to calculate how well these protection measures work together. They do not just look at a single shield; they evaluate the combined strength of multiple defenses acting at once. By weighing the strength of the threat against the combined resistance of the protection measures, they can determine if a facility is likely to survive a specific level of attack. This calculation helps decision-makers choose the right mix of defenses, ensuring that resources are spent on the measures that will actually keep the system running. For example, adding a second power supply might be the most effective step for a communication tower, while a different type of shielding might be best for a control room.

The findings confirm that protecting critical infrastructure requires a coordinated approach that treats the power grid and the communication network as a single, interdependent entity. The study shows that ignoring the link between these systems leaves them vulnerable to cascading failures, where a small hit grows into a massive outage. By mapping the causal links between threats, damage, and failure, and by applying a tailored set of protection measures, it is possible to significantly reduce the risk of total collapse. This framework provides a practical guide for building systems that can withstand intentional attacks and natural hazards, ensuring that when one part of the network is damaged, the other can help it recover rather than dragging it down. The result is a more resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding the complex and evolving threats of the modern world.