A Convergent Electoral System in Proportional Representation: A Midpoint between Closed and Open Lists

In the machinery of democracy, the way citizens cast their ballots determines who sits in the halls of power. For decades, political scientists have debated the best method to translate votes into seats, focusing heavily on two dominant approaches within proportional representation. On one side lies the closed list system, where political parties decide the order of candidates, and voters can only choose the party itself. This method prioritizes the organization, ensuring that the party's leadership controls who gets elected. On the other side is the open list system, where voters have the power to choose specific individuals from a party's roster, allowing them to promote their favorite candidate regardless of where that person sits on the party's official list. This approach favors the individual, giving voters direct influence over who represents them. While both systems have their defenders, each carries significant flaws: the closed list can stifle voter choice and empower party elites, while the open list can encourage expensive, personality-driven campaigns and weaken party unity. The central question for modern democracies is whether there is a way to balance these competing forces without falling into the traps of either extreme.

A team of researchers from universities in Indonesia has proposed a new theoretical framework designed to sit exactly between these two poles. In their paper, they introduce a concept they call Moderate List Proportional Representation. Rather than forcing a country to choose between a party-centric or a candidate-centric system, this new model attempts to blend the two into a single, unified process. The authors argue that the current global trend in electoral design is moving away from these rigid, opposing extremes toward a more balanced midpoint. They suggest that by creating a system that accommodates both party strength and individual voter preference, nations can achieve a more stable and representative democracy. This is not a description of a system currently in use anywhere in the world, but rather a carefully constructed theory intended to solve the persistent problems found in existing electoral models.

The researchers begin by examining the deep flaws in the two systems that dominate the world today. They observe that the closed list system, while good at keeping parties organized, often leaves voters with no say in who actually gets elected. In this setup, a voter might support a party but dislike the specific people the party has placed at the top of its list, yet the system forces them to accept the party's choices. Conversely, the open list system gives voters the power to pick their preferred candidate, but this freedom often leads to a different set of problems. Candidates are forced to spend vast amounts of money on personal campaigns to stand out from their own party members, which can fuel corruption and make elections about personal wealth rather than policy. The authors note that while some might blame the open list system for the rise of money politics, it is only one of several factors, including weak regulations and cultural norms, that drive these issues.

To address these issues, the authors propose the Moderate List Proportional Representation system as a convergent solution. In this new design, a voter is presented with a ballot that offers multiple valid ways to cast a vote. A citizen can choose to vote only for the party symbol, only for a specific candidate's name, or for both the party and a candidate simultaneously. If a voter chooses both, the system splits the value of that single vote in half, giving half a vote to the party and half a vote to the candidate. This mechanism allows the system to capture the strength of the party while still honoring the voter's desire to support a specific individual. The researchers explain that this approach prevents the total dominance of either the party leadership or the individual candidate. It creates a space where a party can maintain its identity and structure, but where a candidate can still rise to power based on personal popularity if they receive enough direct support from the voters.

The theory rests on the idea that this midpoint offers a clearer picture of political reality. Under this system, election results would reveal exactly where a party's true strength lies. If a district votes mostly for the party symbol, it indicates a strong party base. If voters choose specific candidates over the party, it shows that personal reputation is the driving force. This data would help political organizations understand their support more accurately than they can under current systems. The authors also emphasize that this system does not solve the problem of money politics on its own. They argue that while the electoral design matters, eliminating corruption requires a broader approach that includes better laws, independent election officials, and a shift in public attitudes toward how money is used in politics. The new system is simply a tool to make the voting process more reflective of the people's will, rather than a magic cure for all democratic ills.

The researchers acknowledge that no country has yet adopted this specific system. They point to the fact that many nations, particularly in Asia and Latin America, have struggled with their current electoral models, often seeing their democracies stall or regress. By proposing this convergent system, they offer a theoretical path forward for countries looking to reform their voting laws. The goal is to move beyond the endless debate of whether a closed or open list is superior and instead create a hybrid that respects both the need for organized political parties and the individual's right to choose. The paper concludes that such a system could help consolidate democracies by reducing the extremes that currently divide political actors, offering a practical middle ground where both party discipline and personal accountability can coexist.