How Can Rationality Speak of Normativity?
By distinguishing between strong and weak constitutive norms, this paper argues that Davidson's theory of rationality, which links objective truth and maximal agreement to rationality, successfully reconciles his framework with the thesis of meaning normativity despite his apparent anti-conventionalist stance.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
Language is more than a tool for exchanging information; it is the very framework that allows us to think clearly and share a world with others. For decades, philosophers have debated a fundamental question: does the meaning of a word carry a rule that we must follow? This idea, known as meaning normativity, suggests that when we use a word, there is a correct way to use it and a wrong way, much like a traffic law dictates how we drive. Some argue that this rule exists as a rigid, external command, while others believe it is a flexible guide we create for ourselves. The debate has been fierce, with scholars struggling to explain how these rules can exist without being arbitrary or impossible to follow. If meaning is truly normative, there must be a reason why we are bound to use words correctly, and that reason must be deep enough to hold our entire system of communication together.
A researcher at Shanghai University, Yibin Dai, has proposed a fresh way to resolve this long-standing puzzle by looking at the work of the American philosopher Donald Davidson. Instead of searching for a list of rigid rules, Dai suggests that the requirement to use words correctly comes from our very nature as rational beings. The core of the argument is simple yet profound: to be a rational creature, one must possess an objective concept of truth. This means understanding that our beliefs can be right or wrong about the world. But how do we get this concept? Davidson argued that we only develop it through communication with others. When two people talk about the world, they must share a common perspective to even begin a conversation. If they cannot agree on what is happening, they cannot understand each other, and the conversation collapses. Therefore, to be rational and to communicate, we are forced to aim for a state of "maximal agreement" with our listeners.
This drive for agreement is where the normativity of meaning is found. It is not that a dictionary dictates every move we make, but that the act of communicating itself requires us to use words in a way that makes sense to others. If we used words completely randomly, we would cease to be understood, and we would lose our status as rational speakers. Dai explains that this requirement acts as a holistic guide. It does not demand that every single word we speak be perfect or that we never make a mistake. In fact, we can slip up, say the wrong word, or use an unusual phrase, and communication can still succeed. The rule is not about atomic perfection for every single term, but about the overall pattern of our speech. As long as the majority of our words align with how others understand them, we maintain the connection that makes language possible.
The paper carefully distinguishes between two types of rules to clarify how this works. There are strong rules, like the rules of a game where breaking them means you are no longer playing that game. Then there are weak rules, which define the normal way to do something but allow for mistakes without ending the activity. Language operates on these weak rules. We are not expelled from the human community if we misuse a word occasionally; we are simply corrected or misunderstood until we realign. This flexibility is crucial. It means that the normativity of meaning is not a rigid cage that traps us, but a gentle, necessary pressure that keeps our shared reality intact. The author argues that this view solves a major problem in previous theories: it explains how we can have rules without needing a mysterious, external authority to enforce them. The rule is simply the condition of being able to think and speak with others at all.
By grounding meaning in the necessity of rational communication, the paper offers a way to see language as inherently normative without falling into the traps of earlier theories. It rejects the idea that meaning is purely individual or that it relies on fixed conventions that never change. Instead, it shows that meaning is a dynamic, shared achievement. We are bound to use words correctly not because of a contract we signed, but because the alternative is a world where we cannot think or speak together. The research concludes that the "correctness" of a word is found in its ability to help us reach a shared understanding of the truth. This perspective unifies the different ways scholars have tried to understand meaning, showing that the pressure to be right is the very engine that drives our ability to be rational, social, and human.
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