From Delegated Authority to Constrained Actorness: ECOWAS and the Limits of Supranationalism in West Africa
Through a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that while institutional reforms have endowed ECOWAS with significant supranational capabilities in promoting economic integration, democracy, and conflict resolution, its actorness remains constrained by uneven member-state commitments, limited enforcement powers, and regional political complexities, positioning it as a significant but limited supranational entity rather than a fully realized one.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
In the vast landscape of international relations, nations rarely act alone. They form groups to solve problems that are too big for any single country to handle, from stopping wars to building trade routes. But a fascinating question arises when these groups get organized: do they become a new kind of power in their own right, or are they just a meeting place where countries argue and then go home? This is the heart of the study of "actorness," a concept that asks whether an organization can truly make its own decisions, get others to respect those decisions, and actually carry them out. For decades, scholars have debated whether regional groups in Africa, specifically the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have evolved into a powerful entity that can act independently of its members, or if they remain merely a collection of neighbors trying to agree.
A team of researchers from the University for Development Studies in Ghana set out to settle this debate by looking closely at how ECOWAS actually functions. They did not rely on surveys or interviews but instead examined the written rules, official reports, and historical records of the organization. They built a simple test based on three clear ideas: does the group have the freedom to decide things on its own (autonomy), do its members and the rest of the world accept its right to lead (recognition), and does it have the money and people to get the job done (capacity)? By applying this test to the organization's political, legal, and security work, the researchers found a story of impressive progress that is ultimately held back by a lack of resources.
The study reveals that ECOWAS has indeed built a strong foundation for acting on its own. Over the years, the organization has created its own executive office, a parliament, and a court, moving away from a system where only the heads of state could make decisions. The executive branch, led by a commission of experts, can now prepare policies and set agendas without waiting for every leader to agree first. The parliament, though still growing in power, has the right to give binding advice on human rights and treaty reviews. Most notably, the regional court has become a powerful voice for ordinary citizens, allowing them to sue their own governments for human rights violations and win cases that force nations to pay compensation. These structures show that member states have willingly given up some of their power to let the organization run things, proving that ECOWAS has significant independence.
This independence is widely recognized. Inside West Africa, member states generally follow the group's rules on democracy, often suspending countries that experience military coups. Outside the region, major global bodies like the United Nations and the African Union treat ECOWAS as a legitimate partner, granting it observer status and working closely with it on peace and security. The organization has also shown it can fund its daily operations without relying entirely on outside donors. By collecting a small tax on goods moving between member countries, ECOWAS generates enough money to cover about 75 to 80 percent of its administrative costs, a level of financial self-sufficiency that is rare for regional groups in Africa.
However, the researchers found that this strength hits a hard wall when it comes to military power. While the organization has the legal right to intervene in conflicts and the diplomatic skill to negotiate peace, it often lacks the money and equipment to send troops when violence erupts. When a crisis breaks out, the group frequently has to wait for its largest and wealthiest member, Nigeria, to provide the bulk of the funding and soldiers. This reliance means that ECOWAS cannot always act quickly or decisively on its own. In recent years, this limitation has been starkly visible when some member states, frustrated by the group's inability to protect them or by its sanctions, chose to leave the organization entirely.
The final picture is one of a powerful but constrained actor. ECOWAS is not just a talking shop, nor is it a fully independent super-organization like a federal government. It is a hybrid entity that has successfully built the legal and political tools to govern its region, but it struggles to wield the physical force needed to enforce its will when things go wrong. The study concludes that the organization's ability to act depends heavily on the political will and financial commitment of its members. When they are united and willing to pay the price, the organization works well. When they are divided or short on resources, its power fades. This nuanced view helps explain why the group can sometimes resolve conflicts with ease and at other times seem paralyzed, showing that having the authority to lead is only half the battle; having the capacity to act is the other.
Drowning in papers in your field?
Get daily digests of the most novel papers matching your research keywords — with technical summaries, in your language.