Digitally Enabled Accounts and Unsolicited Requests for Money: Exposure and Payment Response among Phone Owners in 75 Economies
Based on 2025 Global Findex data from 75 economies, holders of digitally enabled accounts are significantly more likely to both receive unsolicited money requests and comply with them compared to other phone owners, with the majority of this increased risk occurring at the payment stage rather than the initial contact stage.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
In the modern world, having a bank account or a mobile money wallet is often seen as a ticket to freedom. It allows people to save securely, send money to family, and participate in the economy. For decades, researchers have tracked how these tools lift people out of poverty. Yet, this same digital access creates a new kind of exposure. Just as a house with a front door is easier for a delivery person to reach, a digital account makes a person easier for a stranger to contact. This is the realm of consumer vulnerability, a concept that views risk not as a permanent flaw in a person's character, but as a situation that arises when the right conditions align. In this context, a scam is not just a deceptive practice played on a gullible victim; it is a process that requires a motivated offender, a suitable target with access to funds, and a moment where the target decides to comply. Understanding where this process breaks down is crucial for protecting the millions of people who are newly connected to the global financial system.
A recent study spanning 75 economies, mostly in low- and middle-income regions, investigated exactly how this connection plays out. The researchers looked at a specific, unsettling question: when an unknown person calls or texts a mobile phone owner asking for money, who is more likely to send it? They analyzed data from over 60,000 phone owners, distinguishing between those who held digitally enabled accounts—such as mobile money wallets or bank accounts usable via phone—and those who did not. The study did not verify whether every request was a confirmed scam, but it treated these unsolicited requests as a reliable signal of potential fraud exposure. The goal was to see if having a digital account made people more likely to be targeted, and if so, whether it also made them more likely to pay up once the request was made.
The findings reveal a clear pattern. People with digitally enabled accounts were indeed more likely to be approached. About 23 percent of these account holders reported receiving an unsolicited request for money in the past year, compared to roughly 19 percent of other phone owners. However, the story does not end with who gets contacted. The difference also appeared in the moment of decision. Once contacted, account holders were more likely to send the money. While 6.8 percent of non-account holders who were asked for money complied, 9.3 percent of account holders did. When combining both stages—being asked and then paying—the overall probability of sending money was nearly double for account holders compared to others. This suggests that the risk is not just about being targeted more often, but also about a higher likelihood of complying once the target is reached.
To understand where this gap comes from, the researchers broke the process down into two distinct steps: the exposure to the request and the conversion into a payment. Their analysis suggests that both stages contribute to the difference, with a model-based estimate placing about 63% of the gap at the payment stage. However, the study explicitly notes that the confidence interval for this estimate includes values below half, and the statistical difference between the two stages is not significant. This is a critical distinction for protection efforts. If the problem were only about being contacted, the solution would focus entirely on blocking calls or filtering messages. But because account holders are also more likely to pay when contacted, the solution must also address what happens at the moment of transfer. The study found that this higher payment rate was not limited to accounts used for digital transactions; even those with accounts that were not used for digital payments showed similar premiums. This indicates that the mere existence of an accessible account, rather than the specific technology used to move money, is a key factor.
The researchers also looked for other factors that might explain these results. They examined whether having a phone lock, such as a PIN or fingerprint scanner, offered any protection. Surprisingly, people with locked phones were not less likely to send money; in fact, they were slightly more likely to comply. This suggests that a device lock, which protects the phone from being stolen or used by others, does not stop the owner from being persuaded by a stranger. The study also checked if receiving these requests made people lose trust in banks or stop using their accounts. The data showed no link between receiving a request and becoming dormant or distrustful. This implies that the immediate financial harm of these requests does not necessarily lead to a long-term withdrawal from the financial system, at least not in the way the researchers measured it.
One of the most important takeaways from this work is what it cannot prove. The study is based on a snapshot in time, so it cannot definitively say that having an account causes a person to be targeted or to pay. It is possible that account holders are simply different in other ways—perhaps they have more money, use their phones more often, or have different social networks that make them visible to scammers. The researchers ran simulations to test how strong these hidden differences would need to be to explain the results, and found that while they could not rule out some hidden factors, the pattern of higher payment rates among account holders remained robust even after accounting for many known differences. The study also noted that the requests themselves might not always be malicious; some could be from distant relatives or part of legitimate remittance networks. However, the consistent pattern across dozens of countries suggests that the risk is real and widespread.
For policymakers and consumer protection advocates, these findings point to a specific area for action. Protecting consumers cannot rely solely on stopping the initial contact. Because the decision to pay is a significant part of the problem, safeguards need to be built into the payment process itself. This could mean adding verification steps, introducing delays before a transfer is completed, or creating prompts that ask users to confirm the identity of the recipient. The study emphasizes that these measures need to cover all types of transfers, including those made through agents or over the counter, not just those done through apps. The research serves as a reminder that financial inclusion brings both opportunity and risk, and that protecting the newly included requires looking at the entire journey, from the first unsolicited message to the final transfer of funds.
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