Critical-Mineral Upgrading Across Project Stages: A Comparative Framework for Industrial Policy

The earth beneath our feet holds a treasure trove of materials essential for the modern world, from the lithium that powers our phones to the copper that carries our electricity. Nations rich in these resources often dream of a specific kind of prosperity: not just digging the rocks out of the ground, but keeping the value of those materials at home. This means building factories to refine the raw ore, creating chemicals, and manufacturing the complex components that go into batteries and machines. It is a path toward economic independence and higher wages. However, the journey from a hole in the ground to a finished product is not a single step. It is a long chain of distinct stages, each requiring its own set of skills, permissions, and agreements. A country might have a massive deposit of a valuable mineral, but that does not mean it is ready to build a factory. A signed contract for a plant does not mean the plant is actually running. And a mine that produces a lot of raw material does not automatically mean the country is processing that material into something more valuable.

This reality is the focus of a new study by researchers from universities in Skopje and Krems, who examined three very different mining projects to understand why some nations struggle to move up this value chain. They looked at a lithium project in Serbia that has not yet started production, a lithium operation in Bolivia that is producing but struggling to reach its full potential, and a massive copper mine in Peru that produces huge amounts of raw ore but sends it all away for processing. By comparing these cases, the researchers developed a new way to look at industrial progress. They found that simply having a strategic resource or a government plan is not enough to guarantee success. Instead, every project faces a specific "gate" or bottleneck that must be opened before it can move to the next stage. If a government tries to force a factory to be built before the mine is legally approved, or tries to claim a country has mastered refining when it is only exporting raw ore, they are ignoring the actual blockage. The study suggests that policymakers must first identify exactly which gate is closed for their specific project and fix that before worrying about the next step.

The researchers began by defining the different stages of mineral development, treating them as a sequence rather than a single goal. They distinguished between simply finding a resource, getting the legal permission to dig, actually producing the material, and finally transforming that material into a refined product within the country. They argued that confusing these stages is a common mistake. For instance, a government might announce a "strategic designation" for a mine, which sounds like a green light, but if the environmental permits are not finished and the local communities have not agreed to the project, the mine cannot start. Similarly, a company might build a plant with a huge capacity on paper, but if the technology does not work consistently or the costs are too high, the plant will not produce the promised amount of material. The study emphasizes that you cannot skip steps. You cannot have a refined metal industry if you do not have a reliable supply of raw material, and you cannot have a reliable supply if you have not solved the legal and social conflicts surrounding the mine.

To test these ideas, the team looked closely at three specific cases. The first is the Jadar project in Serbia, which holds a large deposit of lithium and borates. Despite being designated as strategically important by the European Union and having a government plan to develop it, the project has not produced a single ton of commercial product. The researchers found that the project is stuck at the very beginning. The legal permissions are incomplete, the environmental impact studies are not finished, and the local communities have not given their consent. Even though the company has promised to invest billions, the project remains in a state of "care and maintenance," meaning it is not active. The study concludes that for Jadar, the blockage is a combination of legal authorization, social acceptance, and financial certainty. Until these three things are resolved together, no amount of strategic importance can move the project forward to actual production.

The second case is the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia, home to one of the world's largest lithium resources. Here, the situation is different. The country has already produced lithium carbonate, a key battery ingredient, and has a plant with a stated capacity of 15,000 tons per year. However, the actual production has been much lower, reaching only about 2,462 tons in 2025. The researchers found that while the resource is real and the plant exists, the operation has not yet proven it can run reliably at a commercial scale. There are issues with the quality of the raw material, the availability of fuel, and the consistency of the chemical process. The study argues that Bolivia's bottleneck is not a lack of resources, but a lack of proven technical and commercial performance. The country cannot claim to have a mature lithium industry until it can demonstrate that its plants can run continuously, produce high-quality material, and do so at a cost that makes sense, all while managing the environmental impact on the local water and land.

The third case is the Las Bambas copper mine in Peru, which is a fully operational, large-scale producer. It extracted and shipped over 410,000 tons of copper contained in raw ore in 2025 alone. This is a massive amount of production, yet the researchers point out that Peru has not captured the value of refining this copper. The ore is shipped out of the country to be processed into pure metal, meaning the high-value work happens elsewhere. The study found that the blockage here is not about getting the mine to work, but about the logistics and benefits of the supply chain. The road used to transport the ore has been the site of frequent conflicts and protests, disrupting the flow of goods. The researchers argue that before Peru can even consider building a domestic refinery, it must first solve the problems of transporting the ore safely and ensuring that the local communities along the route actually benefit from the mining. Without a stable transport corridor and a fair distribution of benefits, any attempt to build a refinery would likely fail.

The core finding of the study is that these three projects are not just different versions of the same problem; they are at completely different stages of development, and they require different solutions. The researchers call this a "stage-gated" approach. It means that a government cannot apply the same policy to every project. For a project like Jadar, which is stuck before it starts, the priority must be to finish the legal and social agreements. For a project like Uyuni, which is running but not scaling up, the priority is to prove the technology works reliably. For a project like Las Bambas, which is producing but exporting raw material, the priority is to fix the transport and benefit-sharing issues before even thinking about building a refinery. The study warns that trying to skip these steps leads to failure. A government cannot mandate a battery factory if the mine is not legally approved, and it cannot claim to have upgraded its industry if it is still exporting raw ore.

The researchers also highlight that having a "strategic" label for a mineral does not change the reality on the ground. Just because a mineral is important for the global economy does not mean a specific project is ready to go. The study shows that strategic importance cannot replace the need for a legal permit, a working factory, or a happy community. In fact, ignoring these basic requirements in favor of grand strategic plans is a common error that leads to wasted time and money. The authors suggest that policymakers should first identify the specific "gate" that is blocking their project. Is it a lack of permits? A lack of technical proof? Or a lack of trust with local communities? Once that specific gate is opened, then the next step can be considered. This approach prevents governments from making promises about downstream industries, like battery manufacturing, before the upstream conditions, like a stable mine, are actually in place.

Ultimately, the study offers a clear, practical framework for understanding industrial development in the mining sector. It moves away from vague ideas about "value chains" and focuses on the concrete, observable facts of what is actually happening at each site. It shows that the path to economic upgrading is not a straight line but a series of hurdles, and each hurdle must be cleared in the right order. By looking at the real evidence of production, legal status, and community relations, rather than just the size of the resource or the ambition of the plan, countries can make better decisions. The researchers conclude that their method is not a crystal ball that predicts the future, but a tool to diagnose the present. It helps leaders see exactly where they are stuck and what they need to do next, ensuring that the promise of critical minerals becomes a reality rather than just a plan on paper.