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Does university ownership reduce academic invention? Evidence from the abolition of the professor’s privilege in Türkiye

This paper analyzes the impact of Türkiye's 2017 reform transferring academic invention ownership from professors to universities, finding that while total academic patenting remained stable, the shift caused a sharp but temporary 76% drop in filings owned by academics and an 18% overall decline in applications, suggesting that the negative effects of such ownership transfers depend heavily on the readiness of technology transfer offices and the specific channels they replace.

Original authors: Can Apaydın

Published 2026-10-21
📖 5 min read🧠 Deep dive

Original authors: Can Apaydın

Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). ✨ This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer

For decades, a quiet debate has simmered in the halls of universities and government offices around the world: who should own the inventions created by scientists working in academia? For a long time, the default rule in many places was that the professor personally owned their discoveries. This arrangement, often called the "professor's privilege," meant that if a researcher invented a new machine or a chemical process, they held the rights to it, could patent it in their own name, and keep the profits. The logic was simple: the person who made the discovery knew it best and should be free to sell it or start a company to bring it to market. However, starting in the early 2000s, many countries began to change this rule. They decided that the university itself should own the inventions made by its staff. The hope was that universities, through specialized offices dedicated to technology transfer, could manage patents more professionally, find better buyers, and turn more ideas into real products than individual professors could on their own.

The big question for policymakers was whether this shift would help or hurt the creation of new ideas. If you take the rights away from the inventor, do they lose the motivation to invent? In Europe, where this change happened first, the results were stark. When countries like Norway, Germany, and Finland moved ownership from professors to universities, the number of patents filed by academics dropped dramatically, sometimes by half. This suggested that taking away the personal reward and control might have chilled the spirit of innovation. But Europe was a specific case, with mature systems and experienced researchers. What would happen in a younger, developing economy where the rules were different, and where the universities were just starting to build the offices needed to handle these inventions?

This is the story that unfolds in a study of Türkiye, a country that made a similar switch in 2017. Before that year, Turkish university professors owned their own inventions. Then, a new law took effect, transferring ownership to the universities, with the promise that the inventors would still receive at least one-third of any money earned from the patent. The researchers behind this study wanted to see if the Turkish experience would mirror the European drop in innovation or if the outcome would be different. They built a massive database from official patent records, tracking thousands of individual inventors—both those working in universities and those working in private companies—to see how their behavior changed before and after the law passed.

The results revealed a story that was far more nuanced than the European experience. When the law changed, the ownership of inventions did indeed shift quickly and almost completely. Within two years, universities owned seven out of ten patents invented by their staff, a massive transfer of control. However, the fear that this would kill innovation did not come true. While the number of patent applications filed by academics did dip, the drop was modest and short-lived. Over the entire period studied, the total number of applications did not fall significantly compared to the trend of private company inventors. The most notable decline happened only during a specific window of confusion: the eight months between when the law passed and when the detailed rules for how to file were actually written and published. During this gap, professors knew the university now owned their ideas but had no clear instructions on how to hand them over or how to file the paperwork. Once the rules were clear, the filing rates recovered.

The study also looked at the quality of the inventions, not just the quantity. In the years after the reform, the patents that academics filed were actually less likely to be abandoned because of unpaid fees. This suggests that the remaining patents were of higher value, as universities were more willing to pay to keep them alive. The drop in filing numbers was concentrated among professors who had only filed a few patents before the change, while the most prolific inventors kept filing at the same rate. This pattern suggests that the university system acted as a filter, screening out low-value ideas that professors might have filed just to check a box, while keeping the good ones.

Perhaps the most surprising finding was that the presence of well-funded university offices did not seem to change the outcome. The researchers expected that universities with experienced technology transfer teams would handle the transition better, but the data showed that the response was similar whether the university had a strong office or not. This implies that the main hurdle was not a lack of resources, but the sudden change in the rules themselves. The study concludes that moving ownership from professors to universities does not necessarily lead to a collapse in innovation, provided the transition is managed smoothly. In a system where professors were not already running their own successful patent businesses, and where the university has the capacity to manage the process, the shift can happen without the severe losses seen in Europe. The key lesson is that the cost of such a reform depends heavily on how the transition is handled; if the rules are clear and the procedures are ready when the law takes effect, the system can adapt without losing its creative spark.

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