📄 social_science

Knowing without knowing: How confidence in fake news erodes trust and shapes nuclear power acceptance after Fukushima

Based on a nationally representative survey of South Korean adults following the Fukushima treated water discharge, this study reveals that confidence in fake news independently reduces nuclear power acceptance and weakens the link between personal risk perception and acceptance, demonstrating that misplaced certainty undermines trust and resists factual correction more effectively than a mere lack of knowledge.

Original authors: Seoyong Kim, Eunyoung Hong

Published 2026-06-26

📖 5 min read🧠 Deep dive

CC BY 4.0

Original authors: Seoyong Kim, Eunyoung Hong

Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). ✨ This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer

The Big Picture: The "Confident Ignorance" Problem

Imagine you are trying to decide whether to buy a car. You have two sources of information: a mechanic you trust, and a rumor your neighbor told you.

This study looks at what happens when people confidently believe the neighbor's rumor, even if it's completely made up. The researchers call this "false confidence." It's not just that people don't know the facts; it's that they are sure the wrong facts are true.

The study focuses on South Korea and the controversial decision by Japan to release treated radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant. The researchers wanted to see how believing fake news about this water affects whether Koreans support building nuclear power plants in their own country.

The Setup: A Digital Poll

The researchers asked 1,898 South Korean adults a series of questions in May 2024 (about nine months after the water release started). They didn't just ask, "Do you like nuclear power?" They built a special test to measure "fake news confidence."

The "Fake News" Test:
Imagine a quiz where some questions are true and some are lies.

The Lie: "The water released from Japan will contaminate Korean salt within months."
The Truth: "Diluting tritium and releasing it into the ocean is a common international practice."

The test didn't just ask if people knew the answer. It asked: "How sure are you that this statement is true?"
This is the key. The study found that many people were very sure the lies were true and very sure the truths were false.

The Main Findings: What Drives Acceptance?

The researchers built a giant mathematical model to see what makes people say "Yes" or "No" to nuclear power. Here is what they found, using simple comparisons:

1. Trust is the King (The "Handshake")
The strongest thing that makes people accept nuclear power is trust.

If people trust the organizations managing the technology (like the International Atomic Energy Agency or Korean inspectors), they are much more likely to say "Yes."
If they trust the technology itself, they say "Yes."
The Analogy: Trust is like a handshake. If you trust the person shaking your hand, you are willing to get in the car with them. If you don't trust them, you stay on the sidewalk, no matter how safe the car looks.

2. Knowledge is a Weak Player (The "Instruction Manual")
The study found that simply knowing facts didn't help much.

Knowing general facts about nuclear safety helped a little.
But knowing specific details about the Fukushima water discharge did not make people more accepting.
The Analogy: Giving someone a thick instruction manual (facts) doesn't convince them to ride a rollercoaster if they are already terrified. The manual doesn't fix the fear.

3. Fake News Confidence is a Silent Killer (The "Poisoned Lens")
Believing fake news had a direct negative effect. Even if you controlled for how much someone trusted the government or how much they knew, those who were confident in fake news were less likely to support nuclear power.

4. The Most Surprising Discovery: The "Decoupling" Effect
This is the most unique finding of the paper.

Normally: If you think a risk is high (e.g., "I think this water is dangerous"), you will oppose the project. Your opinion matches your fear.
With Fake News: For people who are confident in fake news, this link breaks.
The Analogy: Imagine a thermostat. Usually, if the room gets hot (high risk), the AC turns on (opposition). But for people confident in fake news, the thermostat is broken. Even if they feel the room is hot (they perceive a risk), they don't turn on the AC. Their opposition is driven entirely by the fake story they believe, not by their own actual assessment of the danger. They are "knowing without knowing"—they are acting on a script written by lies, ignoring their own gut feelings about the risk.

What This Means for Communication

The paper suggests that trying to fix this by just "educating" people with more facts won't work.

The Problem: If someone is confident in a lie, they treat facts like noise. They might hear a fact and twist it to fit their lie (e.g., "They say the water is safe? That's just what they want us to think!").
The Solution: You can't just hand out more instruction manuals. You have to address the "poisoned lens" first. You have to actively debunk the specific lies and rebuild trust in the messengers (the organizations) before facts can do their job.

Summary in One Sentence

The study shows that in the debate over nuclear power, trust in institutions is the most important factor, and confident belief in fake news doesn't just make people scared; it breaks the connection between their own fears and their opinions, making them resistant to both facts and trust-building efforts.

Technical Summary: Knowing without knowing: How confidence in fake news erodes trust and shapes nuclear power acceptance after Fukushima

Problem Statement
Public acceptance of nuclear energy is traditionally understood through the lenses of risk perception, institutional trust, and knowledge. However, in an era of misinformation, the role of "false confidence"—the subjective feeling of certainty held in the absence of adequate evidence, particularly regarding demonstrably false claims—remains underexplored. This study addresses the gap in understanding how confidence in fake news concerning the Fukushima treated radioactive water (FTRW) discharge influences public acceptance of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in South Korea. Specifically, it investigates whether believing false claims operates independently of traditional predictors (risk, trust, knowledge) and whether such belief alters the psychological mechanisms by which individuals process risk and trust information.

Methodology
The study utilizes nationally representative survey data collected from 1,898 South Korean adults in May 2024, approximately nine months after the commencement of the FTRW discharge.

Sampling: Quota sampling was employed to ensure demographic representativeness across gender, age, and geographic region.
Dependent Variable: NPP acceptance was measured using a six-item scale (Cronbach's $\alpha$ = .954) assessing general support, willingness to host plants, and safety perceptions.
Independent Variables:
- Risk Perception Factors: Perceived risk of nuclear power, perceived risk of the Fukushima accident, trust in nuclear technology/government, and knowledge of safety organizations.
- FTRW-Specific Factors: Trust in FTRW-related organizations (IAEA, Korean inspection teams) and knowledge of the discharge process.
- Confidence in Fake News: A novel eight-item scale was developed where respondents rated their confidence in the truthfulness of four factually false claims (e.g., "Discharging contaminated water from Japan contaminates Korean salt") and four factually accurate claims. Higher scores indicated greater confidence in false information.
Controls: Sociodemographic variables (gender, age, education, income) and political ideology.
Analysis: Hierarchical multiple regression was used to estimate direct effects, followed by moderated regression analysis to test interaction effects between confidence in fake news and other predictors.

Key Results

Prevalence of Misinformation: Over 50% of respondents expressed confidence in false claims regarding FTRW. The claim that discharge would contaminate Korean salt was believed by over 65% of the sample.
Direct Effects: The full regression model explained 47.3% of the variance in NPP acceptance.
- Trust: Trust in nuclear technology and FTRW-related organizations were the strongest positive predictors.
- Risk: Perceived risks of nuclear power and the Fukushima accident were significant negative predictors.
- Fake News: Confidence in fake news exerted a significant, independent negative effect on NPP acceptance ( $\beta$ = -.032, $p$ < .05), even after controlling for risk, trust, and knowledge.
- Knowledge: General knowledge about nuclear organizations predicted acceptance, but specific knowledge about FTRW had no direct effect.
Moderating Effects: Contrary to the hypothesis that fake news would weaken the effects of trust or knowledge, the analysis revealed a unique moderating pattern:
- Confidence in fake news significantly moderated the relationship between perceived nuclear risk and acceptance.
- For individuals with low confidence in fake news, perceived risk strongly negatively predicted acceptance.
- For individuals with high confidence in fake news, this negative relationship was significantly attenuated (weakened).
- Essentially, high confidence in fake news "decoupled" acceptance from an individual's own risk perception; those certain of false claims did not respond to their own perceived risks in the expected manner.
- Fake news confidence did not significantly moderate the effects of institutional trust or knowledge.

Key Contributions

Identification of a Novel Predictor: The study establishes confidence in fake news as an independent predictor of technology acceptance, distinct from mere lack of knowledge or inflated risk perception.
Mechanism of Influence: The research demonstrates that misinformation does not merely erode trust or inflate risk; it fundamentally alters the cognitive processing of risk. It creates a state where acceptance is driven by false certainty rather than by the individual's own risk appraisal.
Limitations of the Knowledge Deficit Model: The finding that specific FTRW knowledge has no direct effect, while general knowledge does, challenges the assumption that providing technical facts about specific controversies will automatically increase acceptance, particularly when false narratives are entrenched.
Contextual Specificity: The study highlights how cross-border nuclear incidents (Fukushima) interact with domestic energy policy and geopolitical tensions (Korea-Japan relations) to shape public opinion through misinformation.

Significance and Claims
The authors claim that these findings reveal a critical vulnerability in evidence-based policymaking: false confidence can override evidence and undermine the trust mechanisms upon which public acceptance depends. The study argues that once misplaced certainty takes hold, simply supplying facts is insufficient.

The significance of the work lies in its implication for risk communication strategies. The authors posit that communicators must move beyond traditional trust-building and education to actively cultivate "epistemic humility" and proactively correct misinformation. They suggest that the effectiveness of trust-building efforts is not necessarily destroyed by fake news, but that the link between perceived risk and acceptance is severed. Therefore, addressing misinformation is a prerequisite for effective risk communication, as it restores the ability of individuals to respond rationally to their own risk perceptions. The paper concludes that managing the information environment is as critical to nuclear governance as managing technical safety.