The Tradecraft of Homicide: How Organized Criminal Groups use Intelligence and Counterintelligence to Facilitate Acts of Lethal Violence

In the shadow of modern cities, criminal groups operate under a constant, heavy pressure. They must make decisions about violence, money, and safety without knowing exactly what the police are planning or what their rivals are doing. To survive, these groups must treat information as their most valuable resource. They need to know where their enemies are, what they are doing, and when they are vulnerable. At the same time, they must hide their own plans, movements, and identities from the authorities. This dual need—to gather facts while keeping secrets—is the core of what experts call intelligence and counterintelligence. While these terms often bring to mind spies and government agencies, they are simply the processes of collecting useful information and protecting it from enemies. For decades, researchers have studied how terrorist groups or large cartels use these methods, but less is known about how smaller, local criminal gangs in places like Sweden plan their most dangerous acts. Understanding how these groups manage information helps us see the full picture of how organized crime functions in a highly digital and transparent society.

A team of researchers from Malmö University and Lund University decided to look inside the planning rooms of these Swedish criminal groups to see how they prepare for murder. They did not rely on guesses or interviews with criminals who had already been caught; instead, they examined the actual digital footprints left behind during the planning of thirty-nine separate homicide attempts. These records came from encrypted communication platforms that the police had seized, including devices like EncroChat, Sky ECC, and a special phone system called ANOM that was secretly operated by law enforcement to watch criminals. By reading thousands of chat messages between gang members, the researchers could watch the planning process unfold in real time, from the first vague idea to the final, coordinated action. They broke down each plan into small steps, looking for patterns in how the groups found their targets and how they tried to avoid the police.

The study revealed that these criminal groups are highly systematic in how they hunt for information. They do not just guess where a target might be; they build a detailed picture of that person's life using four main tools. The most common method, used in sixty-two percent of the cases, involved sending out lookouts. These were often younger or lower-ranking members of the group who blended into the neighborhood. They did not wear uniforms or carry special equipment; they simply hung out in local areas, watched who came and went, and reported back what they saw. Because they were part of the local social fabric, they could spot unfamiliar faces or notice when a target was alone, turning everyday street life into a surveillance network.

To support these human lookouts, the groups also turned to the digital world. In fifty-six percent of the cases, members scoured social media platforms like Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat. They looked for photos that revealed a target's location, their friends, or their daily routine. Sometimes, they would even create fake accounts to trick a target into revealing their plans or to spread false information that would make the target panic and change their behavior. They also used public government records, which in Sweden are easily accessible to anyone. By looking up vehicle registrations and home addresses, they could connect a name to a car or a house, mapping out a target's family and social circle. In twenty-three percent of the cases, they went a step further by physically attaching GPS trackers to a target's car. This allowed them to see the target's movements in real time, confirming what they had seen on social media or from their lookouts.

However, gathering information is only half the battle. The researchers found that these groups were equally focused on hiding their tracks. They treated every step of the operation as a way to confuse the police. In every single case they studied, the planners arranged for getaway vehicles that were not linked to them. They often used stolen cars or vehicles bought through intermediaries, and they frequently swapped out the license plates for fake ones, sometimes even using plates from other countries to make it harder for police to trace them. In some instances, they used signal jammers to block the signals from any tracking devices the police might have planted on their own cars.

The groups also developed a keen awareness of police activity. In sixty-nine percent of the cases, members actively reported on police patrols, noting where officers were driving and what they were doing. They shared this information within the group to decide when it was safe to move and when they should wait. If they felt they were being watched, they would delay their plans. They also planned how to destroy evidence immediately after the crime. This included burning the clothes they wore, smashing their phones, and setting fire to the getaway cars. In a few cases, they even created distractions, such as blowing up a car in a different part of town, to draw the police away from the actual crime scene.

The researchers concluded that these criminal groups are not just acting on impulse; they are engaging in a sophisticated, back-and-forth struggle with law enforcement. They learn from their mistakes and adapt to new police tactics. While they do not have formal intelligence departments like a government, they use a decentralized network of people to gather and protect information. This approach allows them to remain flexible and hard to catch. The study suggests that organized crime is not just about violence, but about a constant, intelligent effort to manage risk and uncertainty. By understanding how these groups think and plan, law enforcement can better anticipate their moves, and the public can see the hidden layers of information management that underpin the violence in their cities.