Political Instability and Waste Management Services in Mogadishu Municipality

In the crowded streets of a fragile city, the most visible sign of a government's strength is often the simplest: the emptying of a trash bin. When a municipality can reliably collect waste, it signals that the state has the capacity to organize, fund, and protect its people. When that service fails, it is rarely just a matter of dirty streets; it is a symptom of deeper fractures in how a society is run. This reality sits at the heart of research into urban management in places where political order is unstable. The core idea is that garbage collection is not merely a technical job requiring trucks and landfills, but a complex system that depends on steady leadership, clear rules, and the ability to plan for the future. In cities where the government is weak or constantly shifting, these systems often collapse, leaving residents to deal with the consequences alone. Understanding this link helps explain why some cities struggle to keep their streets clean, not because they lack the knowledge of how to do it, but because the political environment makes it impossible to sustain the work.

A new report from researchers at Mogadishu University and Somali National University examines this exact dynamic in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The authors, led by Mahad Abdi Muhumed, set out to understand why waste management in the city remains so broken. They did not conduct a new experiment in a laboratory; instead, they gathered and analyzed existing evidence, including previous studies and local reports, to piece together a clear picture of the situation. Their work suggests that the failure to manage trash in Mogadishu is not caused by a lack of technical know-how or a simple shortage of money. Rather, the primary driver is political instability. The constant uncertainty and conflict in the region have weakened the very institutions—the city departments and government bodies—needed to collect, transport, and dispose of waste safely.

The researchers found that the city's waste system is in a state of severe disarray. In the most detailed technical study of the city's districts, it was revealed that only a tiny fraction of the trash generated is actually collected and taken to a disposal site. There is no organized system for sorting waste, no sanitary landfill to bury it safely, and no consistent schedule for when trucks should arrive. The equipment that does exist is often broken or insufficient, and the staff lack training on how to handle the waste properly. Perhaps most telling is the absence of reliable data. For the past thirty years, there has been almost no official reporting on how much waste the city produces. This lack of information is not just a gap in a spreadsheet; it signals that the city's leadership has not been able to maintain the basic stewardship required to plan for the future. Without knowing how much trash is being made, it is impossible to design a system that can handle it.

The report highlights that this problem is not unique to Mogadishu but follows a pattern seen in other cities across Africa where governance is weak. In places like Kinshasa and Shashemene, similar issues arise: when political power is contested or unstable, resources are diverted away from public services like trash collection and toward military needs or the survival of political elites. In Mogadishu, this means that even when residents are aware of the dangers of open dumping—such as the pollution of water and the spread of disease—they cannot act on that knowledge because the government does not provide the necessary infrastructure. In some neighborhoods, people know that throwing trash into waterways is harmful, yet they continue to do so because there is no alternative. This gap between what people know and what they can do points to a failure of the state to provide basic services, which in turn erodes the public's trust in the government.

The authors argue that fixing this problem requires more than just buying new trucks or hiring more workers. Technical solutions alone will fail if the political environment remains unstable. Instead, the report suggests that the path forward must focus on rebuilding the institutions that manage the city. This means creating clear rules for who is responsible for what, protecting these roles from political interference, and ensuring that different government agencies work together rather than at cross-purposes. The researchers also emphasize the need for an inclusive approach that involves the community, the private sector, and local groups in the solution. They point out that awareness campaigns are not enough; people need practical ways to participate, such as community-based collection groups, but these can only work if the government provides a stable foundation.

Ultimately, the study concludes that the trash piling up in Mogadishu is a visible consequence of political fragility. The city cannot achieve reliable waste services until it treats them as a fundamental part of building a functioning state. This involves stabilizing the institutions that run the city, protecting municipal functions from disruption, and investing in systems that are accountable to the people. The researchers suggest that until these deeper issues are addressed, the cycle of poor service and public distrust will continue. The report serves as a reminder that in a fragile city, the ability to keep the streets clean is not just a matter of sanitation; it is a test of whether the government can effectively serve its citizens.