The case of M.A. v. France: Sex workers’ capacity to self-determination and dignity as coercion

In the landscape of human rights, few concepts are as powerful or as contested as the idea of dignity. For centuries, philosophers and legal scholars have argued that every person possesses an inherent worth that demands respect and protection from the state. This principle is meant to act as a shield, ensuring that individuals are treated as full human beings with the capacity to make their own choices. However, a tension often arises when the state decides what "dignity" looks like for a specific group of people. Sometimes, governments argue that to protect a person's dignity, they must be prevented from making certain choices, even if those choices are made freely by the individuals themselves. This creates a difficult paradox: can a law that claims to protect human dignity actually strip people of their humanity by denying them the right to decide their own fate? This question lies at the heart of a recent legal battle involving sex workers in France, a case that forces us to examine how the law interprets consent, safety, and the very definition of a human being.

In July 2024, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment in a case known as M.A. and others v. France, a ruling that has sent ripples through the global conversation on sex work and human rights. The case began in 2016 when France passed a law criminalizing the purchase of sexual services, a policy often called the "End Demand" model. The logic behind the law was that by punishing the buyers, the state could reduce the demand for sex work, thereby dismantling the systems of trafficking and exploitation that many believe drive the industry. The French government argued that this approach was necessary to safeguard human dignity, asserting that the vast majority of people in sex work were victims of coercion and that no one could truly consent to selling their body.

To challenge this law, a group of 261 sex workers, supported by various health and human rights organizations, took their case to the courts. They argued that criminalizing their clients did not protect them; instead, it forced them into more dangerous, isolated situations where they faced higher risks of violence, had less ability to screen clients, and were cut off from health services and police protection. They contended that the law treated them as if they were incapable of making their own decisions, effectively stripping them of their autonomy and their right to privacy. The case traveled through the French legal system and eventually reached the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where the central question was whether France had overstepped its authority by prioritizing a specific moral view of dignity over the actual safety and rights of the workers.

The researchers behind this analysis, led by Marjan Wijers, examined how the courts handled the clash between two competing human rights arguments. On one side stood the abolitionist view, which sees sex work as an inherent violation of dignity and a form of violence against women, regardless of consent. On the other side stood the sex workers' rights perspective, which emphasizes self-determination—the right of individuals to control their own bodies and lives—and argues that the real harm comes from criminalization, not the work itself. The study utilized a mix of legal analysis, document review, and interviews with activists and the sex workers who brought the case, aiming to understand how the concept of dignity was used to justify repressive laws.

The findings reveal a troubling pattern in how the courts approached the issue. When the case reached the European Court of Human Rights, the judges focused almost exclusively on whether sex work could ever be consensual. They did not deeply investigate the actual effects of the French law on the safety and health of the workers, despite evidence presented that the law had made their working conditions more dangerous. Instead, the court accepted the French government's argument that there was no clear agreement across Europe on how to regulate sex work and that the issue involved "highly sensitive moral and ethical questions." Consequently, the court ruled that France had not violated the European Convention on Human Rights, granting the country a wide "margin of appreciation" to decide its own policies.

The analysis suggests that the court's decision relied on a specific, and arguably problematic, interpretation of human dignity. Rather than viewing dignity as the inherent right of a person to make their own choices, the court appeared to adopt a view where dignity is something the state must protect by restricting those choices. This approach effectively created a hierarchy of "human-ness," where sex workers were denied the status of full, autonomous citizens capable of consent. By assuming that most sex workers were victims who could not truly agree to their work, the court dismissed the lived realities of the 261 applicants, many of whom stated they entered the work voluntarily and were now being forced into unsafe conditions by the law. The ruling treated the workers' agency as an illusion, suggesting that their desire to work was actually a result of manipulation or false consciousness.

Furthermore, the study highlights how the courts ignored the concrete evidence of harm. While the applicants provided testimony and data showing that criminalizing clients pushed them into the shadows, increased their vulnerability to violence, and hindered their access to healthcare, the court did not require the French government to prove that the law was actually effective or safe. The court seemed to accept the idea that the law was a necessary measure to uphold public order and moral standards, even if it came at the cost of the workers' immediate safety. This approach turned human rights into a tool of repression rather than protection, using the language of dignity to silence the voices of the very people the law claimed to help.

The implications of this ruling extend far beyond the borders of France. It demonstrates how human rights arguments can be used in two opposing ways: as a tool for empowerment to fight for recognition and safety, or as a weapon to exclude and dehumanize marginalized groups. By denying sex workers the capacity for self-determination, the court effectively stripped them of their entitlement to human rights protections. The researchers conclude that while human rights remain a radical and necessary tool for those who have never had them, the current legal framework often fails to recognize the agency and dignity of sex workers. The decision in M.A. v. France serves as a stark reminder that without a genuine respect for the lived experiences and choices of individuals, the promise of human rights can be hollow, leaving some people to be sacrificed in the name of a moral ideal they never asked for.