Beyond the Binary: US-China Tension and the Future of Global Infrastructure Diplomacy
This paper introduces the concept of "selective convergence" to explain how US-China strategic competition and global infrastructure diplomacy coexist through operational compatibility in project, normative, and institutional dimensions, even in the absence of strategic trust or ideological alignment.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
Imagine the world as a giant, bustling construction site where countries are building the roads, ports, power grids, and internet cables that keep everything running. For a long time, people thought this site was being run by two rival foremen: the United States and China. The old story was simple: they were fighting a tug-of-war, and the world would eventually have to pick a side, ending up with either a "US-made" world or a "China-made" world. But reality is messier than a tug-of-war. Think of it like a neighborhood where two rival gangs are trying to build the same park. One gang brings the heavy machinery and builds the playground fast, but the other gang holds the zoning permits and the safety codes. Instead of tearing each other's work down, the neighborhood ends up with a playground built by the first gang, but painted, fenced, and inspected by the second gang. This paper explores that weird middle ground. It looks at a concept called "selective convergence," which is just a fancy way of saying: "Rivals can make their machines work together on the same project without actually liking each other or agreeing on the big picture." It's not about friendship; it's about getting the job done while following different rulebooks.
This paper, titled "Beyond the Binary," argues that the intense rivalry between the US and China hasn't created two separate, sealed-off worlds. Instead, it has created a strange, hybrid system where Chinese-built infrastructure often ends up operating under Western rules. The author, Nagapushpa Devendra, suggests that while the two superpowers are fighting over influence, the countries actually building the things (the "host states") are playing a clever game. They use Chinese money and construction crews to build things quickly because Western projects are often too slow or too picky. But then, they let Western regulators, banks, and safety standards come in later to manage, certify, or fix those same projects. The paper finds that this isn't a sign that the US and China are becoming friends or forming a partnership. It's a practical, messy compromise. The US and China are still rivals, but their tools end up mixing in the real world.
The study uses a detective-style approach, looking at three specific "crime scenes" to see how this mixing happens. First, they looked at the Port of Piraeus in Greece. Here, a Chinese company bought the port and runs it like a boss. But because the port is in Europe, it has to follow strict EU laws, safety rules, and labor regulations. The Chinese owners can't just do whatever they want; they have to play by European rules. This is called "accommodative convergence." It's like a Chinese chef opening a restaurant in France; they cook the food, but they have to follow French health codes and serve it on French plates. The paper shows that the Chinese operation survives, but it's shaped by the local rules.
Next, the paper examined Kenya. Here, the story is about money and speed. Kenya needed roads and energy fast, so they hired Chinese builders who could deliver quickly. But as the debt piled up, Kenya had to talk to Western banks and the International Monetary Fund to manage the bills and plan the energy grid. The Chinese built the engine, but Western experts helped write the manual on how to drive it safely and pay for the gas. This is "demand-driven convergence." It happens because the host country is desperate for the building to happen, but they still need the Western safety net to keep the whole thing from collapsing financially.
Finally, the researchers looked at Southeast Asia, specifically the digital world. In countries like Thailand and Vietnam, you have Chinese tech companies building data centers and 5G networks right next to American and Japanese cloud companies. The local governments are like smart traffic cops, letting both sides drive on the same road as long as they follow the local traffic laws. This is "institutionally mediated convergence." The countries use the competition between the US and China to get the best deals, keeping both sides involved without letting either one take total control.
The paper is careful to say what this is not. It is not a sign that the US and China have stopped fighting. They are still rivals. It is not a perfect partnership where they share a single vision or trust each other. And it's not a total merger where the two systems become one big, happy family. The author explicitly rules out the idea that this is a "strategic partnership." Instead, it's a "constrained process." The paper suggests that this mixing is real and happening right now, but it's fragile. If the rivalry gets too hot, or if one side decides to stop playing by the other's rules, this delicate balance could break. The study concludes that we aren't moving toward a world ruled by just one superpower, nor are we returning to a world where the West runs everything. We are entering a "contested field" where ports, power grids, and internet cables are the battlegrounds where development, rules, and power are constantly being renegotiated. It's a world where the US and China are still fighting, but the rest of the world is learning to build with bricks from both sides, as long as the final structure passes the local inspection.
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