When Preferences and Expectations Diverge: External Shocks and Forecasting Taiwan’s Political Future

In the study of how people think about their country's future, political scientists often distinguish between what citizens want and what they think will happen. A person might deeply desire a specific outcome, such as a nation remaining independent, yet simultaneously believe that a different outcome, like unification with a larger neighbor, is the only realistic possibility. This gap between desire and prediction becomes especially wide when the stakes involve war, economic survival, or the reliability of allies. In places where a smaller nation faces a much larger, more powerful neighbor, the public's forecast of the future is not just a reflection of their identity or ideals. It is a calculation of risk, a judgment about whether their preferred path is safe enough to take, and a guess about whether outside powers will step in to help. Understanding this difference is crucial because a sudden shift in what people expect to happen can change how leaders act, even if what the people actually want has not changed at all.

For decades, the relationship between Taiwan and China has been defined by this tension. The two sides are deeply connected by trade and family ties, yet they remain separated by a military imbalance and a history of political distrust. For a long time, surveys showed that the people of Taiwan had a fairly stable view of their future. Most believed that unification with China was more likely than independence, and this outlook held steady for over a decade. Then, in 2020, the pattern broke. The number of people predicting that Taiwan would become independent jumped by seventeen points in a single year, reaching a level not seen before. This surge was puzzling because it happened during a time of intense global uncertainty, including the pandemic and rising tensions between the United States and China. The question researchers asked was simple but profound: Did the people of Taiwan suddenly change their minds and start wanting independence more than before? Or did they keep wanting the same things but simply start believing that independence was now more possible?

To answer this, a team of researchers from Duke University and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, turned to a massive collection of survey data known as the Taiwan National Security Survey. This data tracks the attitudes of the Taiwanese public over many years, asking them not just what they prefer, but what they think is likely to happen. The researchers focused on a specific group of people they call "conditional supporters." These are citizens who say they would support independence, but only if China did not attack in response. They are the swing voters of the political landscape: they want independence in theory, but their support vanishes if the cost is war. The researchers suspected that the 2020 surge in independence predictions came not from people changing their fundamental desires, but from these conditional supporters changing their minds about what was feasible.

The analysis revealed that the 2020 shift was indeed driven by a change in expectations, not a change in desires. When the researchers broke down the data, they found that the number of people who strictly wanted independence, regardless of the risk, grew only slightly. The number of people who strictly opposed independence also shrank only a little. The real movement happened within the group of conditional supporters. Before 2020, many of these people believed that independence was too dangerous to predict as a likely outcome. They feared that declaring independence would trigger a military invasion that Taiwan could not survive. However, in 2020, their forecasts shifted dramatically. The share of conditional supporters who predicted independence nearly doubled. They did not necessarily become more pro-independence in their hearts; rather, they began to believe that the path to independence was less blocked by the threat of war than they had previously thought.

The catalyst for this change appears to be the events in Hong Kong. In 2020, Beijing imposed a strict national security law on Hong Kong, effectively ending the autonomy that had been promised to the region. For many people in Taiwan, this was a stark warning that the promise of "One Country, Two Systems"—a model where Taiwan could join China while keeping its own way of life—was no longer credible. The researchers found that the people who reacted most strongly to the Hong Kong crackdown were exactly the conditional supporters. For them, the crackdown did not make independence safer in a military sense. Instead, it made the alternative—living under Chinese rule—seem less acceptable and less trustworthy. When the option of peaceful accommodation with Beijing looked like a trap, the option of independence became a more plausible forecast, even if the military risks remained high.

This shift in thinking did not last forever. The researchers tracked the data through 2025 and found that the surge in independence expectations eventually faded. By 2025, the number of people predicting independence had fallen back to levels closer to those seen before 2020. This decline was also driven by the same conditional supporters. As time passed and the immediate shock of the Hong Kong events receded, the link between their identity and their forecast weakened. They began to weigh the military risks and the uncertainty of American support more heavily again. The study shows that the people did not permanently convert to a new political identity; instead, they temporarily adjusted their view of what was possible. When the political environment made the alternative seem less viable, they leaned toward independence. When the environment became less charged, they returned to a more cautious calculation of risk.

The findings offer a clear lesson about how public opinion works in dangerous, asymmetric rivalries. A sudden jump in the number of people predicting a dramatic political change should not be read as a permanent shift in what those people want. It can simply be a reaction to a change in the perceived landscape of possibilities. The people of Taiwan did not suddenly decide they wanted independence more than before; they decided that the path to independence looked less impossible for a few years. This distinction matters because it suggests that public expectations can be volatile and reversible, swinging with external events even when the underlying desires of the population remain steady. It also highlights the unique role of the conditional supporter: they are the group most sensitive to changes in the political climate, and their forecasts are the ones that move the needle for the entire society.

In the end, the story of Taiwan's political future is not just about who wants what. It is about how people judge the odds. The researchers found that when the credibility of one path collapses, as it did with the Hong Kong model, people will look toward the other path, even if the dangers are still there. But as the shock wears off, the fear of those dangers returns, and the forecasts shift back. This cycle of hope and caution, driven by external events rather than internal transformation, explains why the public mood can swing so sharply and then settle again. It is a reminder that in the world of high-stakes politics, what people think will happen is often a reflection of what they can imagine, not just what they desire.