You Must Not Eat from the Dead Tree of Modal Collapse
This paper argues that Joseph C. Schmid's proposed "intentional" and "providential collapse" problems against classical theism are not genuine threats, because providential collapse reduces to intentional collapse, and intentional collapse only arises under a specific model of action that the author rejects, thereby demonstrating that modal collapse arguments are even less viable than previously thought.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
In the realm of philosophy of religion, thinkers have long debated the nature of a supreme being, often described as a perfect, unchanging, and simple entity. This view, known as classical theism, holds that God is not made of parts; there is no separation between who God is and what God does. If God is truly this simple, a logical puzzle arises: if God's act of creating the universe is identical to God's own eternal nature, and God must exist, then it seems the universe must also exist necessarily. This would mean the world could not have been otherwise, stripping reality of any chance or freedom. For decades, philosophers argued that this "modal collapse" was a fatal flaw in the idea of a simple God. However, a recent shift in the debate suggests that introducing the concept of indeterminism—where a cause does not guarantee a single specific effect—can break this logical chain, allowing for a universe that is both created by a simple God and genuinely free to be otherwise.
Building on this recent development, philosopher Enric F. Gel explores the consequences of this solution in a new paper. He examines two fresh problems that critics say arise once the original logical trap is avoided: the loss of God's intentional control and the loss of God's providential oversight. Gel argues that the second problem is actually just a shadow of the first, and that the first problem can be solved by rethinking how we understand the nature of a deliberate action. His work suggests that the fear of a "dead" logical tree was premature, and that classical theism can survive these challenges by adopting a specific view of how agents act.
The story begins with the realization that if God is simple, God's act of creating is not a separate event from God's existence. Critics argued this forces the universe to be necessary, but Gel notes that recent thinkers have proposed a way out: if the link between God and the universe is indeterministic, then God can exist necessarily while the universe remains contingent. In this view, God's single, unchanging act can result in different outcomes in different possible worlds without changing God's nature. While this saves the theory from the original collapse, critics Joseph C. Schmid and others argue it creates new dangers. They claim that if God's act is the same in every world but the results vary, God cannot truly be an intentional agent who knows and chooses what happens. Furthermore, they argue God cannot be in control of which specific world comes to be, leading to a "providential collapse" where God's plan becomes meaningless.
Gel investigates these new threats and finds that the second one, the loss of providential control, is not a separate issue at all. He argues that if God can be shown to act intentionally, then God is automatically in control of the outcome. The real battle, he suggests, is over the first problem: whether God can act intentionally without having a changing internal plan that varies from world to world. To solve this, Gel distinguishes between two ways of understanding how a person or being acts with purpose. The first, which he calls the mediate account, suggests that to act intentionally, an agent must first form an internal state, like a specific thought or volition, that causes the action. If God acted this way, Gel explains, the theory would fail, because God cannot have different internal thoughts in different worlds without losing his simplicity.
However, Gel proposes that the classical theist should instead embrace the second model, the immediate account. This view, rooted in the work of philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, suggests that an agent can act intentionally in a direct and basic way without needing a prior internal state to trigger the action. In this model, the action itself is the expression of the agent's reason for acting. Gel illustrates this with the example of a person moving their arm. We do not necessarily form a separate, distinct mental command to move the arm before the arm moves; rather, the movement itself is the intentional act, done for a reason. If God creates in this same direct manner, then God does not need a changing internal blueprint to create different worlds. God simply acts intentionally, and the specific world that results is the direct expression of that action.
By adopting this immediate view of action, Gel argues that the classical theist can maintain that God is a simple, necessary being who intentionally creates a contingent world. God does not need to have a different internal intention for every possible universe; instead, God acts for reasons that are always present in his nature, such as the desire to share goodness, while the specific result varies indeterministically. This approach dissolves the fear that God is a passive observer of a random universe. Instead, God remains the direct source of every specific creation, acting with purpose even without a changing internal plan. Gel concludes that the "dead tree" of modal collapse was actually more dead than we thought, and that by shifting our understanding of how intention works, the door remains open for a coherent view of a simple, intentional, and provident God.
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