Evaluation of Governance, Institutional, and Policy Dimensions of Rainfall-Induced Landslide Risk in Malawi

When heavy rains fall on steep hills, the ground can give way, sending mud and rocks tumbling down to destroy homes and lives. This is a rainfall-induced landslide, a danger that is becoming more frequent and severe as the climate changes and forests are cleared. But the story of why these disasters hurt some people more than others is not just about the weather or the soil; it is about how societies organize themselves to handle the risk. This field of study, known as disaster risk governance, looks at who is in charge, how different groups work together, and whether the people meant to be protected actually have a say in their own safety. It asks whether the rules and relationships between governments, aid groups, and local communities are strong enough to stop a small problem from becoming a catastrophe. In places where the government has limited money and staff, this question becomes even more urgent, because the system relies heavily on outside help to function.

A new study from Malawi, a country in southern Africa, takes a close look at how this system works when the rains come. The researchers focused on two very different places that have suffered badly from landslides: Soche Hill, a steep, crowded area on the edge of the city of Blantyre, and the rural villages of Bokosi and Nkhulambe in the Phalombe District. Over eight months, the team talked to government officials, non-governmental organizations, and community members, and they watched how these groups interacted during recovery efforts after major cyclones. They wanted to understand who was actually doing the work of keeping people safe, how these groups were connected, and whether the current way of managing risk was working or if it was setting people up for failure.

The study found a system that is split in two. On one side, the government holds the official power and the legal responsibility to manage disasters. On the other side, non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, are the ones actually doing most of the work on the ground. In Malawi, these groups provide the majority of the services, from mapping dangerous areas to helping communities build better storage for their grain. The government supports them by giving official permission and technical advice, creating a partnership where the NGOs act as the hands and the government acts as the face. This arrangement has kept essential services running despite severe budget limits, but the researchers argue that it has created a fragile situation. The government is present in name, but often absent in practice, leaving the communities dependent on aid groups that may leave when their funding runs out.

One of the most significant findings is that the push to hand over more power to local districts and cities is happening too fast. The country is trying to move decision-making and money down to local councils, a process called decentralization. The idea is that local leaders know their communities best and can respond faster. However, the study shows that many of these local councils do not yet have the money, the skilled staff, or the strong systems needed to handle such a big job. Because they lack these tools, they often cannot manage the risk effectively. Instead, the power and resources that are supposed to go to the local government often get caught up in political games. Local politicians sometimes use disaster relief funds to win votes or give help only to their supporters, rather than helping everyone who needs it. This means that the very people meant to lead the solution can sometimes become the biggest obstacle to it.

The researchers also discovered that the way money flows into the country is shaping what gets done. Because most of the funding comes from foreign donors, the priorities are often set by those donors rather than by the local people. This leads to a situation where aid groups are very active in some high-profile areas but ignore other vulnerable communities that are just as at risk. Furthermore, the system tends to focus on reacting to disasters after they happen, rather than spending money to prevent them in the first place. Politicians are more likely to get funding to fix a broken road after a landslide than to build a drainage system to stop the landslide from occurring. This creates a cycle where communities are constantly recovering from the last disaster instead of preparing for the next one.

The study concludes that while the current system of relying on NGOs has kept things moving, it is not sustainable in the long run. The government needs to step up and be more visible in the communities, not just as a boss signing papers, but as a leader coordinating the effort and ensuring that help reaches everyone fairly. The researchers suggest that handing over more power to local areas should wait until those local areas are truly ready to handle it. Until then, the country risks repeating the same mistakes, where resources are wasted, trust is lost, and the most vulnerable people remain unprotected. The path forward requires a better balance: keeping the flexibility and speed of the aid groups, but building a stronger, more accountable government presence that can lead the way and ensure that resilience is built to last.