Guardianship Inversion and Enforcement Asymmetry: The US‑Iran Conflict in Comparative Perspective

International law is often imagined as a set of rules that apply equally to everyone, like traffic lights that stop a bicycle and a truck with the same red signal. In reality, the system designed to keep the peace relies on a group of powerful nations that act as its guardians. These guardians are supposed to judge conflicts and enforce the rules, but a new analysis asks what happens when one of those guardians becomes a fighter in the very war it is meant to police. The core question is not whether the rules disappear when powerful nations clash, but how the rules themselves become uneven tools when the person holding the gavel is also the one swinging the hammer. This dynamic creates a situation where the side with the most power can shape the narrative of the conflict, control what evidence is seen, and block the consequences that would apply to a weaker nation.

A research article by Kunle Olawunmi, published in August 2026, investigates this problem by looking at the conflict between the United States and Iran. The study focuses on a specific mechanism the author calls "guardianship inversion." This term describes a moment when a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council—a nation with special, permanent authority to make binding decisions—becomes a direct participant in a war or a protector of a fighting ally. Instead of stepping aside to let the institution judge fairly, that nation keeps its seat at the table. It uses its privileged position to influence how the conflict is described, to filter the information available to other members, and to prevent the institution from taking action against its own conduct. The research argues that this is not just a simple abuse of power, but a structural flaw where the guardian and the belligerent are the same person, turning the system of restraint into a system of unequal enforcement.

The paper builds its case by tracing the history of the relationship between the United States and Iran, starting with a 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This agreement was designed to manage distrust not by hoping the two sides would trust each other, but by setting up a system of independent inspectors who could verify that Iran was not building a bomb. For a time, this worked. The inspectors provided a shared source of truth that both sides could rely on. However, when the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018, that shared system of verification began to crumble. As the inspectors lost access to information, governments on both sides began to rely more on their own intelligence and worst-case assumptions. The paper shows how this loss of independent knowledge made it easier to view the other side as an existential threat, setting the stage for open war.

By 2025 and 2026, the situation had escalated into direct military conflict. The United States and Israel launched attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, and Iran responded with missile and drone strikes. Throughout this violence, the United Nations Security Council remained active, but its actions were deeply uneven. The Council passed resolutions condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf states, yet it could not pass similar measures against the United States or Israel because the United States, as a permanent member, held the power to block them. The study notes that the United States did not even need to use its veto power to stop a resolution; the mere knowledge that it could do so changed the behavior of the Council before a vote was ever taken. This created a situation where the institution could judge one side but was structurally unable to judge the other, even when both sides were using force.

The research compares this situation to three other conflicts to see if the pattern holds true elsewhere. In the war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia, as a permanent member, blocked the Security Council from condemning its own invasion, forcing the issue to a different body that lacked the power to enforce its decisions. In the 1982 conflict over the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom, another permanent member, allowed the Council to pass a resolution against Argentina because it helped Britain's legal position, but later blocked measures that would have stopped its own military campaign. In the Sahel region, French military operations were investigated by United Nations missions, but because France was a permanent member and a key partner, the findings were often disputed or lacked a clear path to punishment. These examples suggest that the problem is not unique to the United States or Iran, but is a recurring feature whenever a powerful nation fights while sitting on the council that is supposed to judge the fight.

The study finds that the rules of war do not vanish during these conflicts. Instead, they become fragmented. Different parts of the international system handle different pieces of the problem. The International Atomic Energy Agency tried to monitor nuclear safety but could not stop the attacks. The International Maritime Organization recorded attacks on ships but could not end the hostilities. The Security Council could condemn some actions but not others. This fragmentation means that while the world sees many rules being applied, the enforcement is not reciprocal. A powerful nation can claim it is acting in self-defense, control the evidence that supports that claim, and use its position to ensure that no independent body can effectively challenge it. The result is a cycle where the lack of equal restraint encourages more violence, which in turn reinforces the belief that the enemy is a permanent danger that must be stopped by force.

The author concludes that the solution is not to abolish the special status of these powerful nations, which is unlikely to happen, but to change how they behave when they are involved in a fight. The paper suggests that when a permanent member is a direct participant in a conflict, it should voluntarily step back from voting on measures related to that conflict. It should also be required to explain publicly why it is using its power to block action. Furthermore, the systems that monitor conflicts, such as nuclear inspectors, need protection so they can continue to work even when fighting breaks out. The goal is to make the privilege of these guardians more visible and accountable, ensuring that the system of international law does not become a tool for the powerful to judge themselves while leaving the weak to be judged by everyone else. The research indicates that without these changes, the international order risks a slow decay where the rules remain on the books but lose their power to restrain the very nations that created them.