Forum Shopping and Geopolitical Fragmentation in Southeast Asian Nuclear Security Governance after the Nuclear Security Summits
This paper argues that the non-hierarchical nature of the global nuclear security regime complex enables Southeast Asian states to engage in "forum shopping" by selectively prioritizing low-accountability mechanisms over high-accountability ones, a behavior that exacerbates regional security vulnerabilities amidst the post-2016 decline of Nuclear Security Summit momentum and calls for tailored policy interventions to strengthen governance without relying on major-power consensus.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
Imagine a world where countries must agree on how to keep dangerous nuclear materials safe from theft or sabotage. To manage this, the international community has built a complex web of rules, treaties, and organizations. Some of these rules are strict and require countries to open their doors for independent inspections, while others are softer, asking only for a written report or a signature on a document. This system is not run by a single boss; instead, it is a collection of overlapping groups, each with its own way of checking up on nations. In this landscape, countries have a choice: they can choose to engage deeply with the strictest, most demanding rules, or they can choose the path of least resistance, picking the easier venues that look good on paper but require less real work. This strategic selection is known as "forum shopping." It is a behavior where nations seek out the rules that cost them the least effort while still appearing to be good global citizens. The question that concerns security experts is whether this freedom of choice helps keep the world safe, or if it allows dangerous gaps to form where nuclear materials are left vulnerable.
A new study from the National Defence University of Malaysia investigates exactly how this dynamic plays out in Southeast Asia, a region where the use of nuclear technology for peaceful energy and medicine is growing rapidly. The researchers, Nasser Ali AlHassani and Mohd Mizan, wanted to understand if countries in this region are truly securing their nuclear materials or if they are simply checking boxes to avoid harder scrutiny. They focused on the period after 2016, when a series of high-level global meetings called the Nuclear Security Summits ended. These summits had previously pressured world leaders to take concrete action, but without that political pressure, the researchers suspected that countries might have returned to the easier, less effective habits of forum shopping. To find out, the team analyzed over one hundred official documents, including treaty records and security reports, and spoke with five experts who work directly in the field of nuclear security.
The study uncovered a clear and measurable pattern. The researchers found that many countries are indeed engaging in forum shopping, but in a very specific way. They are highly active in the low-effort areas, such as signing treaties or submitting written reports to the United Nations. However, they are much less active in the high-effort areas that actually prove a country is safe. For instance, while 80 percent of the relevant countries have signed a key treaty regarding the physical protection of nuclear materials, only 68 percent have hosted an independent team to inspect their facilities and verify that their security systems actually work. This twelve-point gap is not a mistake; it is a strategic choice. The data shows that countries with weaker security performance scores are the ones most likely to stick to the easy tasks and avoid the tough inspections. Even more telling is the behavior of countries that do start the hard work: once a country hosts an initial inspection, the number of those same countries agreeing to a follow-up visit to prove they fixed the problems drops by a massive forty-two percentage points. They start the process to look good, but they stop before the accountability gets real.
This pattern has become more pronounced since the end of the Nuclear Security Summits and the recent deterioration in cooperation between major world powers. During the summit years, the political pressure kept countries honest. Now, without that pressure, the "compliance facade" has returned. The study argues that this is not necessarily because countries lack the money or the technology to be safe; many of the countries skipping the hard inspections have the capacity to do so. Instead, it is a matter of political will. They are choosing to avoid the scrutiny that would expose their weaknesses. In Southeast Asia, this creates a dangerous situation. As nations like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines expand their nuclear energy programs and use more radioactive sources in hospitals and factories, the amount of dangerous material in the region is increasing. Yet, at the exact moment when these materials are growing, the system designed to watch over them is becoming less effective. The region's own security agreements, while strong on the principle of not having nuclear weapons, lack the technical mechanisms to check if the physical security of these new materials is actually up to standard.
The researchers conclude that the current system allows countries to satisfy their legal obligations without ever proving they are safe. A nation can be fully compliant with all international laws and treaties while still having weak physical protection systems that fall short of global safety standards. To fix this, the paper suggests that Southeast Asian nations do not need to wait for global superpowers to agree on a new system. Instead, they can use the tools they already have. The authors recommend that regional groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum start tracking and discussing which countries have hosted independent inspections, making this information a regular part of regional security talks. They also suggest that countries with strong security systems, such as Malaysia and Singapore, should share their expertise with neighbors who are just starting their nuclear programs. By building a regional network of peer support and transparency, these nations can close the accountability gaps that forum shopping has opened, ensuring that the growth of nuclear energy in the region does not come at the cost of safety. The study confirms that while the rules exist, the real challenge is ensuring that nations are willing to be held accountable for the work behind the rules.
Drowning in papers in your field?
Get daily digests of the most novel papers matching your research keywords — with technical summaries, in your language.