India’s Network-Building Strategy and the Constrainment of China: A Re-examination of the Accommodation Thesis

In the complex world of international relations, countries constantly navigate how to deal with powerful neighbors without losing their own independence. For decades, the standard playbook for dealing with a rising rival involved two main choices: either form a tight, formal military alliance to block them, or try to stay completely neutral and friendly with everyone at once. But a new study suggests that a major power, India, has found a third way. Instead of building a single, rigid wall against its neighbor China, India has been weaving a vast, flexible web of connections. This approach relies on building many different types of partnerships—some for trade, some for defense, some for technology—without signing a single binding treaty that would force it to follow another country's orders. The researchers call this strategy "comprehensive accommodation," where a country aligns its goals with a powerful partner like the United States to manage a rival, but does so through a network of loose, overlapping agreements rather than a formal marriage. This method allows a nation to raise the costs for an aggressive neighbor and complicate their plans, all while keeping its own hands free to make independent decisions.

The study, conducted by scholars from universities in India and Germany, examines the last decade of Indian foreign policy, specifically from 2014 to 2024, to understand how this strategy works in practice. The authors argue that India is not trying to completely stop or "contain" China in the old Cold War sense, which would mean trying to roll back Chinese influence everywhere. Instead, India is practicing "constrainment." This is a more limited goal: making it harder and more expensive for China to expand its power in specific areas, like the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asia, without trying to destroy China's position entirely. To achieve this, India has constructed a sophisticated network of relationships. This includes strengthening ties with countries like Japan, Australia, and Vietnam; joining small groups of nations to discuss specific issues; and building physical connections like shipping routes and transport corridors that link India to the wider world.

The researchers analyzed official government statements, international agreements, and historical records to map out this strategy. They found that India's approach is not a random collection of deals, but a deliberate design. For example, India has joined groups like the Quad, which brings together India, the US, Japan, and Australia to discuss security, and the I2U2, a group focused on food and energy security. It has also signed agreements to share military supplies and intelligence with the US and France, allowing their ships and planes to operate more smoothly together. Yet, at the same time, India has refused to join any formal military alliance that would legally bind it to fight for another country. It has even maintained trade and diplomatic ties with Russia and Iran, countries that are often at odds with the West. This flexibility is the key to the strategy. By building a dense web of connections, India gains the security benefits of being close to the United States without the political cost of becoming a formal ally.

A major turning point in this story occurred in June 2020, when Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed in the Galwan Valley, resulting in the deaths of twenty Indian soldiers. Before this event, India's strategy was more cautious, trying to balance its relationships with both China and the West. The clash changed everything. The authors argue that this event acted as a catalyst, pushing India to solidify its network-building strategy. After 2020, India moved faster to deepen its ties with the US and its partners, restricted Chinese investment, and accelerated the development of its own supply chains. The study suggests that this shift proves India is no longer just "hedging," or keeping its options open in case the future is uncertain. Instead, it has settled on a clear path of aligning with the US-led order to manage the challenge posed by China, while still using its independent voice to avoid being seen as a puppet.

The paper challenges several other popular ideas about what India is doing. Some experts believe India is practicing "strategic autonomy," meaning it stays completely independent and refuses to pick sides. The authors argue this is incorrect because India has clearly tilted its weight toward the United States and its partners in recent years, even if it keeps some distance. Others suggest India is "multi-aligning," or engaging equally with all major powers. The study shows this is not the case either, as India is deepening some relationships while actively trying to limit China's influence. The authors conclude that the most accurate description is "comprehensive accommodation." This means India has accepted a role within a US-led system to secure its own interests, but it has chosen to do so through a network of flexible, partial agreements rather than a single, rigid alliance.

This approach allows India to act as a bridge between different parts of the world. For instance, India maintains a working relationship with Iran, a country under heavy sanctions from the United States, to build a port that helps trade with Central Asia. A country in a formal alliance with the US would likely be forced to cut ties with Iran, but India's network strategy allows it to navigate this tension. It secures a special waiver to continue the project because it serves a broader goal of regional connectivity that the US also supports. This kind of maneuvering is only possible because India is not locked into a strict treaty. The study suggests that this model of "constrainment" is likely to be more durable than a formal alliance because it fits India's history of non-alignment while still delivering the security benefits of being close to a superpower.

The researchers also point out that this strategy is not just about military power; it is deeply economic and technological. India is working with the US and other partners to build supply chains for semiconductors and artificial intelligence, reducing its reliance on Chinese technology. This creates a structural alignment where India's economy becomes more integrated with the West, even if its government rhetoric remains independent. The study notes that while India is not trying to defeat China, it is successfully making it more difficult for China to dominate the region. By creating a credible alternative network of trade and security, India ensures that China cannot become the only game in town.

Ultimately, the paper presents a clear picture of a nation that has found a middle path. India is not trying to contain China in the old, aggressive sense, nor is it trying to stay completely neutral. It is building a web of connections that raises the price of Chinese aggression and complicates its path forward. This strategy relies on the idea that you can achieve your goals by weaving a strong net of partnerships rather than building a single, heavy wall. The authors believe this approach has been successful in the last decade, particularly after the 2020 border clash, and that it offers a realistic model for how other nations might manage the rise of powerful rivals without losing their own sovereignty. The study concludes that while the situation remains complex and the future is never certain, India's current path of network-building and strategic accommodation is a coherent and effective response to the challenges of the modern world.