Democracy, Radical Right Populism and Climate Policy
This study analyzes data from 60 countries to reveal that while populist radical right parties generally weaken climate policy in hybrid regimes, their impact is mitigated in consolidated democracies unless high corruption exists, whereas material climate vulnerability can constrain such negative effects even in hybrid systems.
Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer
Climate change demands action that is both bold and enduring, yet the path to such action is often blocked by the very nature of politics. Good climate policy requires looking far into the future, investing money today for benefits that may not appear for decades. This long view clashes with the short-term rhythm of elections, where leaders are often tempted to prioritize immediate gains over distant risks. Complicating this picture is the rise of populist radical right parties. These political groups frequently frame climate action as a project imposed by distant elites, arguing that it harms ordinary citizens and national sovereignty. As these parties gain votes, a pressing question emerges: does their electoral success inevitably lead to weaker climate laws, or can the structure of a nation's government stop this from happening?
A team of researchers from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem set out to answer this by looking at how different types of governments handle the pressure from populist movements. They gathered data from 60 countries across six continents, covering the years 2007 to 2023. This period represents nearly half of the global population and includes a wide mix of political systems, from stable democracies to hybrid regimes that sit somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism. The researchers measured three main things: how much support populist radical right parties received in elections, how strong a country's climate policies were, and the quality of that country's democratic institutions. They also looked at two specific conditions that might change the outcome: how corrupt a government is and how exposed a country is to physical climate dangers like floods, droughts, and heatwaves.
The study found that the threat posed by populist parties is not the same everywhere. In countries with stable, consolidated democracies, the presence of a strong populist movement does not automatically lead to weaker climate policies. In these nations, the institutions of government—such as independent courts, professional bureaucracies, and legal checks and balances—act as a shield. They prevent short-term political pressures from dismantling long-term climate commitments. However, this protection is not absolute. The researchers discovered that when political corruption is high, even a consolidated democracy loses its ability to resist. In corrupt systems, the safeguards that usually block populist demands break down, allowing elected populists to weaken climate laws just as they might in less democratic countries.
The situation is different in hybrid regimes, which are countries that have some democratic features but lack the full strength of established democratic institutions. In these places, the rise of populist parties is strongly linked to a decline in climate policy. Without robust institutions to hold them back, populist leaders in hybrid regimes are much more successful at rolling back environmental protections. Yet, even here, there is a limit to what politics can achieve. The researchers found that in hybrid regimes, a country's physical vulnerability to climate change acts as a brake on policy retreat. When a nation faces severe risks from storms, rising temperatures, or water shortages, the material cost of ignoring the problem becomes too high. Even if a populist government wants to abandon climate action, the immediate threat to the country's safety and economy forces them to keep some policies in place.
The study also examined specific examples to illustrate these patterns. In Hungary and Poland, where democratic backsliding has occurred, rising populist support coincided with weaker climate governance and resistance to international climate goals. In contrast, the Netherlands and Finland saw their populist parties gain votes while their climate policies continued to strengthen, thanks to resilient democratic institutions. The researchers noted that Brazil, despite being a democracy, saw its climate protections crumble under a populist leader, a case they attributed to high levels of corruption undermining institutional integrity. Conversely, the United States, which experienced democratic decline and rising populism, saw its climate policy ultimately rebound following the Inflation Reduction Act, a shift the authors suggest was consistent with the idea that high climate exposure can constrain governments' ability to sustain policy retrenchment.
Ultimately, the research suggests that the fate of climate policy depends less on the ideology of the politicians in charge and more on the quality of the system they operate within. Democracy alone is not a magic shield; it must be backed by clean, honest institutions to be effective. Similarly, the physical reality of climate change can force governments to act, even when their political preferences lean toward inaction. The study concludes that the relationship between populism and climate policy is conditional. It is not a simple story where populism always wins, but rather a complex interaction where strong institutions and real-world dangers determine whether climate action survives the political storm.
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