State-Building in Somalia: Political Settlements, Policy Failure, and Persistent Instability

Somalia is a country that has spent decades trying to rebuild itself from the ground up. Since the early 2000s, the international community has poured billions of dollars into the nation, hoping to stabilize its government, secure its borders, and help its people recover from years of conflict. This effort relies on a simple idea: if you provide enough money, security forces, and new government buildings, a functioning state will eventually emerge. However, the reality on the ground tells a different story. Despite receiving roughly thirty billion dollars since 2010—an amount equal to about twelve hundred dollars for every single person in the country—the nation remains fragile. Political arguments continue to erupt, the economy struggles to lift ordinary citizens out of poverty, and armed groups still control large parts of the land. This disconnect between massive investment and persistent instability raises a difficult question: why do these well-funded plans keep failing?

To understand this, researchers look at the concept of a "political settlement." In plain terms, this refers to the unwritten and written agreements among the country's most powerful leaders about how to share power, money, and authority. A country can build a parliament or a police force, but if the leaders behind those institutions cannot agree on who gets to decide what, the system will not hold. In Somalia, the challenge is compounded by a system called federalism, where power is divided between a central government in the capital and several regional states. While this structure was designed to bring different groups together, it has often become a source of conflict, with leaders fighting over borders, resources, and who has the final say.

A new study by Abdirahman Hassan Hersi from Salaam University examines this puzzle by looking closely at the last decade of Somali history, specifically focusing on the administrations of Presidents Farmajo and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Rather than simply counting how many dollars were spent or how many battles were won, the researcher analyzed the meaning behind the political actions, the language used in official documents, and the stories told by the people involved. This approach, known as interpretive policy analysis, treats politics as a conversation where different groups try to make sense of their world. By listening to these conversations and tracing the history of recent decisions, the study aims to uncover why the country remains stuck in a cycle of crisis despite the best intentions of its leaders and foreign donors.

The investigation reveals a clear and troubling pattern. The study finds that Somalia has been rebuilding its formal state institutions—such as its army, its federal regions, and its election systems—much faster than it has been able to settle the underlying political arguments needed to make those institutions work. It is as if the country has constructed the shell of a house, complete with walls and a roof, but the people living inside have never agreed on who owns the keys or how to split the rent. Because these fundamental agreements are missing, every new policy or reform tends to collapse under the weight of old distrust.

During the presidency of Farmajo, from 2017 to 2021, there were some visible improvements in security. The national army grew stronger, and the government managed to push back against the militant group al-Shabaab in some areas. However, these gains were shallow. The army remained a collection of different forces loyal to various regional leaders rather than a single, unified national force. The president tried to centralize power and fight corruption, but this only deepened the rift between the central government and the regional states. Instead of creating a stable government, these efforts led to a political deadlock where the president and the prime minister could not agree, and relations with regional leaders broke down completely. The study suggests that the political system was too fragile to handle these tensions, and the lack of a shared agreement on how to govern meant that progress in one area, like security, was quickly undone by conflict in another, like politics.

The situation did not improve significantly under the next administration, led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud from 2022 to 2026. Although this government launched a major military offensive against al-Shabaab and gained support from international partners, the core problems remained. The study points out that the government and the regional states still do not trust each other. Efforts to rewrite the country's constitution to clarify how power is shared have instead become a new source of fighting, with different groups accusing each other of trying to grab too much control. The military has made some tactical gains, but because the political leaders cannot agree on a unified strategy, these gains are not sustainable. The militant group al-Shabaab remains a powerful force because it has built its own systems of justice and taxation in the areas it controls, filling the void left by a government that cannot provide security or services.

The research also highlights that the money flowing into the country has not reached the average citizen in a way that builds stability. While the top ten percent of the population captures more than half of the national income, the bottom half receives less than ten percent. This extreme inequality means that the economic growth and aid that do exist do not help the majority of people. In fact, the heavy reliance on foreign aid has sometimes weakened the bond between the government and its people. In a healthy state, citizens pay taxes and the government provides protection and services. In Somalia, because the government relies on foreign money rather than taxes from its own people, it does not feel the same pressure to serve them effectively. This allows groups like al-Shabaab to step in and provide their own version of order, which many locals find more reliable than the distant central government.

Ultimately, the study concludes that the recurring failures in Somalia are not due to a lack of effort or a shortage of resources. The problem is that the country has tried to build the structures of a modern state without first solving the political arguments about who holds power and how it is shared. The formal institutions exist on paper, but they lack the social and political foundation to function. The researchers argue that unless the leaders of Somalia can reach a new, inclusive agreement that respects the needs of different regions and clans, and unless they can build a government that is led by Somalis rather than dictated by outside donors, the cycle of instability will continue. The state has been rebuilt faster than the political compact required to make it govern, leaving the nation in a state of perpetual crisis where every new attempt at reform risks becoming another source of conflict.