Knowledge gaps in biosafety biosecurity and good laboratory practices among medical laboratory scientists in a Nigeria tertiary healthcare facility

Inside the clinical laboratories of a hospital, a quiet but vital battle is fought every day. These rooms are where doctors learn the truth about a patient's illness, but they are also places where dangerous germs are handled. To keep the scientists, the patients, and the wider community safe, these rooms must follow strict rules. These rules fall into three main categories. The first is biosafety, which is simply the practice of protecting people from accidentally catching a disease while they are working with it. The second is biosecurity, which means making sure that dangerous germs are not stolen or used by someone with bad intentions. The third is good laboratory practice, a set of daily habits that ensure the work is done correctly and the equipment is clean. Without these layers of protection, a simple mistake could lead to a scientist getting sick or a dangerous germ escaping into the community.

In Nigeria, the hospitals that handle the most complex cases face a heavy burden. They deal with high numbers of sick people and often have to work with limited resources. Because of this, it is crucial to know if the scientists working there actually understand and follow these safety rules. A team of researchers from the University of Calabar decided to find out. They went into a major teaching hospital in the south of the country and asked one hundred medical laboratory scientists about their knowledge and their daily habits. The goal was not just to see what they knew in their heads, but to see if they could put that knowledge into action when the lights were on and the work was busy.

The researchers asked the scientists a series of questions about their training, their equipment, and their safety plans. They wanted to know if the staff understood what biosafety meant, if they knew how to handle waste, and if they had the right tools to protect themselves. The results painted a picture of a workforce that knows the definitions but struggles with the reality of the job. Just over half of the scientists, about 54 percent, could correctly explain what biosafety and biosecurity meant. This suggests that the basic idea is there, but it is not universal. More worrying was the finding that only 4 percent of the scientists had received training on what to do in an emergency involving dangerous biological toxins. When a spill happens or a dangerous agent is released, knowing the plan is a matter of life and death, yet almost everyone in the study lacked this specific preparation.

The gap between knowing the rules and following them was even wider when it came to the physical safety of the laboratory. While 54 percent of the scientists said they stored contaminated waste properly, other critical areas were neglected. Only 28 percent knew if their workplace had a vaccination program for staff who handle dangerous germs. Perhaps most concerning was the lack of communication and reporting. Nearly two-thirds of the scientists said there was no regular meeting or forum where they could discuss safety issues. Furthermore, almost half of them reported that there was no system in place to report accidents or near-misses. In a safe laboratory, admitting a mistake is how you prevent it from happening again, but here, the system for learning from errors appeared to be missing.

The physical tools needed to do the work safely were also in short supply. Only about one-third of the scientists said that personal protective equipment, such as gloves, masks, and gowns, was always available to them. Even more striking was the use of special cabinets designed to catch dangerous air particles. These cabinets are essential when working with germs that can float in the air and infect someone nearby. Only 30 percent of the scientists said they used these cabinets for such work, while the vast majority said they did not. This is like trying to fight a fire without a hose; the risk of exposure remains high. Additionally, 92 percent of the respondents said there were no written instructions for cleaning up spills or practicing safety drills. Without a written guide or a practice session, the scientists are left to guess what to do when things go wrong.

The study also looked at how strictly the laboratory controlled access to dangerous materials. Only 34 percent of the scientists said that access to these materials was restricted to authorized people only. This is a key part of biosecurity, ensuring that only the right people can touch the most dangerous samples. The researchers found that the scientists were often unsure about how to move these materials safely from one place to another. The lack of clear rules and the absence of regular safety checks meant that the laboratory was operating without a solid safety net. The scientists were doing their best, but they were working in an environment where the systems designed to protect them were either broken or missing entirely.

The researchers concluded that while the scientists had some theoretical knowledge, the practical application of safety was failing. The problem was not a lack of intelligence or effort, but a lack of resources, training, and clear policies. The study showed that without regular training, without emergency plans, and without the right equipment, the safety of the laboratory is compromised. The authors suggest that the solution requires more than just writing new rules. It demands that hospitals provide the necessary training, enforce the use of protective gear, and create a culture where safety is discussed openly and accidents are reported without fear. Until these changes are made, the scientists and the community they serve remain at risk. The path forward is clear: the knowledge exists, but it must be turned into action through better support and stricter enforcement of safety standards.