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Circumventing EU Sanctions through Third-Country Refining: Evidence from Russian Oil Trade

Using a gravity-model and event-study framework, this paper provides evidence that China, India, and Turkey have acted as key intermediaries in circumventing EU sanctions by importing Russian crude oil and exporting refined products to the EU following the 2022 restrictions.

Original authors: Tadashi Ito, Kiyoyasu Tanaka

Published 2026-10-27
📖 5 min read🧠 Deep dive

Original authors: Tadashi Ito, Kiyoyasu Tanaka

Original paper licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). ✨ This is an AI-generated explanation of the paper below. It is not written or endorsed by the authors. For technical accuracy, refer to the original paper. Read full disclaimer

In the world of global trade, nations often use economic penalties to pressure governments they disagree with. These sanctions act like a fence, blocking specific goods from crossing borders to weaken an opponent's economy. When the European Union decided to stop buying oil directly from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, it drew a sharp line in the sand: no Russian crude oil could enter its ports. However, the rules governing what happens after that oil is processed are far more complex. Crude oil is a raw material that must be refined into usable fuels like gasoline and diesel. The sanctions banned the direct import of the raw Russian oil, but they did not explicitly ban the import of the finished fuel products, even if those products were originally made from Russian oil. This created a potential gap in the fence. If a country could buy the discounted Russian oil, refine it into fuel, and then sell that fuel to Europe, the oil would effectively bypass the ban. The question for economists and policymakers was whether this loophole was being used on a large scale, turning the global oil market into a game of hide-and-seek where the origin of the fuel was obscured by a change in its form.

Researchers Tadashi Ito and Kiyoyasu Tanaka set out to find out if this specific type of circumvention was actually happening. They focused on the period after the sanctions began in late 2022, looking for a very specific pattern in the flow of oil. Their hypothesis was straightforward: if the sanctions were being bypassed through third countries, those countries would suddenly start buying massive amounts of Russian crude oil, and at the same time, the European Union would suddenly start buying massive amounts of refined fuel from those same countries. To test this, they examined global trade data, looking for a synchronized shift that could not be explained by normal market changes. They identified three likely candidates for this role: China, India, and Turkey. These nations were chosen because they maintained friendly political ties with Russia, possessed the massive industrial capacity needed to process heavy Russian oil, and had existing trade relationships that made such a switch feasible.

The data revealed a dramatic and sudden reorientation of the oil trade that aligns perfectly with the circumvention hypothesis. Before the sanctions, the trade flows between Russia and these intermediary countries were relatively stable. However, immediately after the bans took effect, the pattern changed. Imports of Russian crude oil into China and India surged by enormous margins, jumping by 272 percent in 2022, over 5,000 percent in 2023, and more than 10,000 percent in 2024. This was not a gradual adjustment but a sharp, immediate pivot. Simultaneously, the European Union began importing significantly more refined petroleum products from these same countries. The volume of these refined fuel imports from China, India, and Turkey increased by 63 percent in 2022, nearly doubling in 2023, and remaining high in 2024. The timing of these two events—the massive influx of raw Russian oil into the intermediaries and the massive outflow of refined fuel from them to Europe—happened in lockstep. This synchronized shift suggests that the raw material was indeed being shipped to these countries, processed, and then sent on to Europe as a new product.

To ensure these findings were not just a coincidence or a result of other market forces, the researchers compared these results against other groups of countries. They looked at nations that also imposed sanctions on Russia, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. These countries did not show the same pattern; they did not increase their imports of refined fuel from the intermediary nations. Furthermore, the researchers examined EU member states that were exempt from the crude oil ban, such as Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, which could still buy Russian oil directly via pipelines. These exempt nations did not increase their imports of refined fuel from the intermediaries, whereas the sanctioning EU nations did. This contrast confirms that the surge in refined fuel imports was driven specifically by the need to bypass the ban on direct crude oil imports, rather than by a general increase in global demand for fuel.

The study concludes that the sanctions, while successful in stopping direct imports of Russian crude, inadvertently created a pathway for the oil to re-enter the European market in a different form. The researchers found that China and India emerged as the primary hubs for this process, acting as the crucial link that allowed Russian oil to be refined and sold to Europe legally. While the exact percentage of Russian oil hidden inside every barrel of fuel sold to Europe cannot be measured directly because the molecular origin is untraceable, the trade volumes tell a clear story. The data suggests that the sanctions were effectively circumvented through a process of transformation, where the raw material was bought, changed, and resold. This finding highlights a significant challenge in designing economic sanctions: banning a raw material is often insufficient if the rules do not also account for the finished products that can be made from it, especially when the countries processing those materials have the capacity and the political will to do so.

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